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ABSTRACT 
 
This research analyzes why diplomacy is failing in the Dominican Republic. In this thesis, 
I describe how Dominicans construct their foreign affairs, and the limitations that diplomacy has 
had in the country. In order to achieve these goals, I have analyzed official documents such as the 
2013 and 2015 payrolls of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and legal documents including Article 
146 from the Constitution, Organic Law 314 from 1964, and the Protocol of Transparency and 
Institutions. I argue that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Dominican Republic lacks 
seriousness and is characterized by the following variables: (1) patronage, (2) corruption, and (3) 
the systematic violation of Dominican law. The thesis emphasizes how these variables have had a 
tremendous impact on the exercise of diplomacy. The research analyzes the reaction of the 
Dominican state and its citizens and how the nation responds to criticisms by the international 
community. Dominican citizens think that the opinion of international media is a campaign against 
their country. The implications of this false public perception is an intense nationalism, and the 
government encourages this. The true problem, as this thesis demonstrates, is institutional 
weakness. The government uses intense and widespread nationalism to hide institutional weakness 
and state corruption. After exploring this dialogue between the government, citizens and 
international media, I move forward framing concepts such as soft power and new public 
diplomacy to reinforce the importance of listening to foreign publics. In addition I explain why the 
country needs to change the traditional approach to foreign affairs. The adoption of a new public 
diplomacy is required to establish credibility and the integration between state, citizens and 
international publics.
  1 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER I 
Changes and Challenges in the Dominican Diplomacy 
Introduction 
Diplomacy in the Dominican Republic has a lot of challenges. The constant conflict with 
Haiti and the accusations by the international community that categorize the nation as a racist 
country have force the Dominican Republic to proactively work toward cultivating a more positive 
reputation.  However, I argue that in order to improve the nations’ international reputation, the 
Dominican Republic has to address the internal weaknesses in its Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This 
internal evaluation would help in projecting a better image of the country. After the accusations of 
racism, the diplomatic reaction has been to invest money in improving the country’s reputation by 
paying for public relations officials to explain the Dominican perspective (Thomas, 2015). The 
government, instead of trying to address the problems of patronage, corruption, and the failure to 
uphold the laws by the Ministry, looks for an easy solution. I evaluate the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs to analyze why diplomacy is failing in the Dominican Republic. First, I discuss what type 
of diplomacy Dominicans have been pursing. What has made diplomacy remain retrograde in the 
face of global changes? I then analyze the variables of patronage, corruption, and “law and reality” 
in the Ministry. 
 I examine the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to identify the law’s antagonism, specifically in 
regards to the role of public officials. One of the main issues in the institution is that officials are 
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not working to construct strong public diplomacy in the countries to which they are assigned. 
Consequently, the Dominican Republic has a questionable form of diplomacy, which is only 
implemented when the country receives international pressure. Former diplomat Bernardo Vega 
highlights that there are people who receive a paycheck as foreign consulate officers but who have 
never left the Dominican Republic (Reuters, 2014). The lack of seriousness in the exercise of these 
officials has damaged the reputation and effectiveness of the Dominican Foreign Service. 
Resolving this problem should be one of the first steps in achieving a new framework of 
Diplomacy.  
There is a danger in believing that the international community is implementing a 
misguided campaign to discredit the Dominican Republic in terms of its relations with Haiti. 
Rather than focusing first on the Dominican Republic’s relationship with its neighbors, this thesis 
focuses on reviewing what the Dominican Republic is doing in terms of public diplomacy. I 
hypothesize that the nation’s negative reputation is due to the failure of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Specifically, I argue that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not have an effective or 
even workable international relations strategy because the diplomatic corps is not actually working 
in the countries where they are supposed to be. The local and international press has declared that 
the diplomatic corps in the Dominican Republic is an agent of "empty bottles" (Reuters, 2014). 
This term is used to describe public officers where the official receives a salary and does not attend 
to his or her duties.  
This thesis highlights the importance of strong institutions in the development of 
diplomacy. I argue that negative international opinion could help Dominican officials to reframe 
a new diplomacy. Diplomacy should be viewed as a way to promote economic, political and 
cultural activities by the diplomatic corps, but also as a way of presenting the national agenda to 
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the foreign public. Transparency of the national institutions is key to being successful in this kind 
of diplomacy.   
 
Importance of Study 
In the Dominican Republic the international dynamic has been historically to develop a 
defensive diplomacy. Every time that the country is facing a challenge in the international arena, 
the executive and a group of Ministers meet to develop a public relations strategy which will appeal 
to the foreign public (MIREX, 2015). The country currently faces criticism around the world 
because of its racist policy towards people of Haitian descent. The Dominican Republic needs a 
different type of diplomatic approach to lead the country in building strategic international 
relations. Reforming the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could help the country live up to its full 
potential. 
I argue the necessity of controlling patronage, corruption and the execution of the laws in 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This reform is crucial to the consolidation of democracy. Failure 
to do so provokes a problem for diplomatic accountability.  
This research highlights the importance of the reconstruction of Dominican international 
relations through employing soft power and public diplomacy. A solid external politics cannot 
exist if clear and feasible internal guidelines are not established. In this sense, the analyzed 
variables--patronage, corruption and the violation of Dominican law-- explain the institutional 
shortcomings that the country faces. 
Patronage 
Patronage affects the diplomatic body of the country. The election of officers by political 
patronage and cronyism creates a deficit of professionalism in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The 
situation generates collateral damage to professionals in the field, since the opportunities to 
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exercise the career turn out to be affected by lobbying and political influences. It is important to 
expand professionalism in state administration in order to reach strong policy decisions.  
The patronage relationship between the government and political elites in state 
administration is also a problem that presidential, monarchic, and parliamentary systems all face. 
(Farazmand, 1997). The problem caused by patronage is that citizens begin to resent how the 
government uses the resources of the state. According to Farazmand, “...growing budget deficits 
and higher taxation, have caused major concern regarding the role of government in society in 
general and the role of the bureaucracy in particular” (Farazmand, 1997, p. vii). For this reason it 
is important to have qualified officials who can respond to the real challenges of the diplomacy, 
and, who can achieve accountability.  
Corruption 
The Dominican Republic, with a population of 10.41 million, has high levels of corruption. 
According to Transparency International Dominican Republic has more nepotism than Mexico, 
Colombia and Brazil (Corruption Perceptions Index, 2014).  
Transparency International defines political corruption as “a manipulation of policies, 
institutions and rules of procedure in the allocation of resources and financing by political decision 
makers, who abuse their position to sustain their power, status and wealth” (Transparency 
International, 2016). The payrolls of the institution of Foreign Affairs reflect how state 
administrators use their power to recommend families to the diplomatic corps. This action is a 
violation of the Dominican constitution and other laws.  
Law and Reality 
Latin American laws are based in Southern European legal tradition, specifically the Siete 
Partidas and the Napoleonic Code. According to Richard M. Morse, law in this context is often 
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understood as an ideal, or an utopian notion of how society should behave, rather than what the 
society must do. Morse stresses that “the Partidas were not so much rules for conduct in the Roman 
sense but rather medieval types of principles of proper conduct and of the well-ordered society and 
polity that approached the sanctity and status of being moral treaties.” (Wiarda, 1992, p. 214). 
Likewise, Morse emphasizes that the Napoleonic Code was not successful in the region because it 
proposed a worldview which was “anti-feudal and highly individualistic, while Latin America 
remained essentially a corporate-feudal arena.” (Wiarda, 1992, p. 217). In that sense, the adoption 
of ideas from both systems has contributed to an authoritarian and personalistic political culture. 
Dominican institutions have a dichotomy between laws and reality; the Dominican state 
creates beautiful laws that politicians then violate for their own purposes. Bernd Reiter explains 
that laws in Latin American countries are created just to provide a framework for how a society 
should act, which is actually very far from how the society is ordered in the present. This type of 
state mentality developed from a heritage of colonization and rooted in legal idealism. As Reiter 
states, “legal idealism characterizes a system where laws are created and codified by elites, who 
take little interest and are indeed unfamiliar with the reality of the majority” (Reiter, 2013, p. 139). 
 
Research Design and Methodology 
In this thesis I have measured the variables of patronage, corruption, and the execution of 
law in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Dominican Republic between the years 1986-2015. I 
first observed the situation of the country in the summer of 2015 when the international media 
denounced the nation as racist, and the Dominican government defensively reacted. During this 
time, the government contracted public relations agencies to defend the country by implementing 
a national strategy to address media claims. This crisis led me to question why the government had 
to contract PR agencies when the Dominican Foreign Service is already supposed to fulfill this 
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function. I have examined the negative reports about the Domincan Foreign Service by the 
Dominican national media between 2013 and 2015. I identify that the headline “Dominican 
Republic’s ‘empty bottles’ diplomats under scrutiny,” published by Reuters in May 16 in 2014, 
had a powerful influence on Dominican public opinion. The importance of this claim by 
international media provoked a local media critique of the Foreign Service. Acento.com.do 
composed a series of documents where the media could obtain the 2013 payroll of all who were 
paid by the State Department. The article describes how political patronage (clientelism) and 
corruption tainted diplomacy. After analyzing this media coverage, I then compare the variable of 
corruption with the Corruption Perception Index 2014, by Transparency International and the 
United Nations Blue Book, which illustrate the quantity of Dominican diplomats in UN. 
The documents published by Acento.com.do contain a list of names, and highlight the 
Foreign Service officials identities and how they received their appointments. The 2013 payrolls 
contain a list of Reformist Party (PRSC) members. It also contains a list of people recommended 
by the senator Felix Bautista, who was accused of corruption in 2012 for illegal construction 
contracts in Haiti, and who is one of the most corrupt politicians in the world according to 
International Transparency in 2016. Furthermore, I completed my own analysis of the 2015 Payroll 
where I discovered some irregularities. I identify a list of positions where the minimum wage is 
higher than the amount that officials are “earning”.  
I then assessed historical documents in order to understand how the Dominican patronage 
system works. I evaluated how the exchange of favors was part of the Dominican transition to 
democracy. In order to measure corruption and the disconnect between law and reality, I examined 
primary sources such as the Dominican Constitution, the 1964 Organic Law, and two documents 
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from the institution “Citizen Participation1” where I evaluate the measurement 7 and 9 concerning 
transparency in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
I also interviewed the Dominican historian Mu-Kien Sang via email. Sang has written two 
books on foreign affairs “The Dominican Foreign Affairs 1844-1961” and “The Dominican 
Foreign Affairs 1961-1974,” both books cover a large period of the history of Dominican Foreign 
Affairs. Sang’s analysis correlated with the three periods that I identified as the most remarkable 
in the diplomatic history of the country: the Trujillo dictatorship, the transition to democracy under 
Joaquin Balaguer, and the period of globalization under Leonel Fernández. 
I used all this data to assess the current and future state of Dominican Foreign Affairs. The 
data confirms the culture of patronage, corruption and the difference between law and reality that 
characterize Dominican institutions.  
 
Concepts and Definitions 
In this thesis, I discuss several concepts, such as “soft power strategy” by Joseph Nye. Nye 
offers a diplomacy model that explains impact on foreign public perception. As Jian Wang explains 
“Foreign public opinion is gaining ever more significance in forming an emerging globalized 
public and influencing international political process and outcome” (Wang, 2005, p. 91). In the 
case of the Dominican Republic, the declarations in the international media about racism in the 
country demonstrated that the Dominican authorities were alert to how their national reputation is 
constructed.  The strategy of soft power in diplomacy provides a model for a coherent, coordinated 
                                                          
1 Citizen participation is a non-partisan civic movement established on 31 October 1993, arising as a result of a 
process of reflection among citizens, to achieve from the participation of the civil society, respect for the will of the 
people in the electoral process to face the floating corruption and to strengthen the political institutions of the 
country. 
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and structured diplomacy rather than the creation of a defensive, or an impromptu diplomacy 
(Wang, 2005).  
The basic distinction between traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy is, according to 
Melissen that “the former is about relationships between the representatives of states, or other 
international actors; whereas the latter targets the general public in foreign societies and more 
specific non-official groups, organizations and individuals” (Melissen, 2005, p. 5). The Dominican 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs is challenged to leave the old traditional form of diplomacy and adopt 
“public diplomacy.” Wang describes public diplomacy  as “not merely about advocating and 
promoting political and economic goals to the international public; it is, instead, about relationship 
building between nations and cultures through better communication” (Wang, 2005, p. 93). 
Another concept I use in my analysis is patronage. That is, the remuneration for political 
favors between officials and citizens using state resources. Richard Graham points out that 
patronage has developed in Latin American countries through the activity of social and economic 
elites. Further, Graham stresses that people have accepted this political behavior and have not 
traditionally considered it to be unethical because “it was rooted in an ancient social system and 
ultimately in familial and interpersonal relationship built up over a long time” (Graham, 1990, p. 
7). Patronage is also referred to as “political clientelism” and it has been a characteristic of many 
Latin American governments. The executive power is usually the incubator of clientelism. 
Presidents have used clientelism through their political campaigns to obtain votes by providing 
jobs to the people who supported them. In the case of the Dominican Republic, Joaquín Balaguer 
went to the streets a few months before the elections and gave food to people in the villages. In the 
case of this study, I highlight the high levels of clientelism by evaluating the payrolls of the 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs and how political alliances were a principal factor in the spread of 
clientelism. 
Wilfredo Lozano explains that the power of institutions in the Dominican Republic and in 
Latin America are related to states, social classes and elites. Lozano describes government as “the 
package of rules, formal or informal, which govern relations between different actors and 
organizations in the principal areas of social, economic and cultural life” (Lozano, 2010, p. 2). 
Government institutions in the Dominican Republic are characterized by lobbying and personal 
influences, and are thus weak. 
The Dominican Republic has a myriad of laws; however, there is a lack of execution. The 
diplomat and lawyer Rafael Molina Morillo explains that the country has a collection of laws for 
everything, and it appears that the nation has high institutional consolidation. However, the main 
problem that the country faces is that “nobody fulfills them” (Mis Buenos Días, Morillo, 2004). 
Likewise, the former diplomat in United States and Canada highlights that the first people who 
violate the laws are public officials. Consequently, the nation has weak institutions. 
Foreign Affairs-New York emphasizes that the problem with the rule of law is that, even 
though elites discuss the necessity of implementing the laws, they do not want to obey the laws. 
As Thomas Carothers stresses, “most Latin American governments have acknowledged the need 
for rule-of-law reform and are taking steps toward it, or at least proclaiming that they will. But 
judicial and police reform has run into walls of bureaucratic indifference and entrenched interests” 
(Carothers, 1998, p. 1). Additionally, Carothers argues that Latin American systems are full of 
corruption, cynicism, and impunity with a disparity in what the rule of law and legal institutions 
must be. Carothers describes that the rule of law has to be equal for everybody and that the judicial 
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system has to be autonomous and neutral without the manipulation of political and economic elites 
(Carothers, 1998). 
In the book Informal Institutions and Democracy, Helmke and Levitsky (2006) describe 
the difference between informal and formal institutions in Latin America. The authors evaluate the 
effectiveness of institutions and explain that laws in Latin America are difficult to put into practice. 
The authors point out that the rule of law is not implemented because many legislators try to make 
profit rather than enforce the laws (Helmke & Levitsky, 2006) There is no clarity about the 
sanctions that exist in the Dominican Republic when a diplomat is not exercising his/her functions 
abroad, even though the Constitution condemns all forms of corruption in the organs of the state. 
The culture of breaking the law is also problematic of the level of the Dominican citizen. 
Helmke and Levitsky compare the citizen’s perception and the success of formal institutions, and 
analyzes that, “where formal institutions are effective, actors believe there is a high probability 
that noncompliance will be sanctioned by official authorities. Where formal rules and procedures 
are ineffective, actors believe the probability of enforcement (and hence the expected cost of 
violation) to be low” (Helmke & Levitsky, 2006, p. 13). I have shown that there is a discourse 
between the rule of law and how states create laws to satisfy international legitimacy.  
 
Organization of the Thesis 
 
In chapter 2, I discuss how global changes and technologies provide a new perspective to 
ensure public diplomacy and the importance that a country actually pays attention to international 
public opinion. I analyze the relative position between states and diplomacy in the region. I then 
describe the difference between traditional diplomacy and the new public diplomacy. Experts 
agree that most Latin American nations follow outdated foreign affairs parameters and are 
retrograde in terms of soft power, especially where the state does not integrate local citizens and 
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foreign publics into its overall strategy. This chapter also discusses my interview with the 
Dominican historian, Mu Kien Sang, who stresses the difficulties of achieving soft power in the 
country. Sang provides historical arguments that are valuable in understanding Dominican 
international relations during the Trujillo dictatorship and the governments of Joaquin Balaguer 
and Leonel Fernández. In addition, I describe the reactionary diplomacy and the nationalist 
discourse that Dominicans have developed around foreign affairs. 
In chapter 3, I point out that the government used a nationalist discourse against the 
international criticism to hide the weaknesses in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MIREX, 2015). 
I make the argument that there is a lack of seriousness in the institution because Foreign Service 
officers are not working in the places that they are assigned, and this creates weak diplomacy. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Dominican Republic has been admonished for hiring surplus 
personnel. In 2014, the institution had 1,396 officials published on the payroll; however, in 2015 
the minister of Foreign Affairs claims that 1,200 officials were removed. These and other 
irregularities highlight the urgency for true accountability in Dominican diplomacy. 
 Also in chapter 3, I analyze 3 variables: patronage, corruption, and the lack of adherence 
to the law. I show how alliances between political parties create patronage and how corruption 
affects the Ministry. I examine the MIREX payrolls from 2013 and 2015, where high levels of 
corruption and political clientelism were established. In this chapter, I also evaluate three 
documents concerning the Ministry and demonstrate how state governments and citizens have 
sometimes struggled to implement the laws. I argue that both the state and the citizens believe that 
the laws are pieces of paper that can be removed or adjusted when they want.  
In chapter 4, I conclude by describing the consequences of the institutional weaknesses of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I also explore some implications of this problem; the Dominican 
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state constructed a sense of nationalism in order to hide the internal issues in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. I identify the importance of listening to international public opinion and the role 
of citizen participation that would be required in order to obtain diplomatic accountability and 
accomplish soft power. 
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CHAPTER II 
Dominican Foreign Diplomatic History 
Introduction 
Dominican foreign policy continues to have many shortcomings. In this chapter I analyze 
the historical context of Dominican diplomacy in order to scrutinize the principal factors that have 
damaged the institution. In the first part of this chapter, I stress how globalization has changed the 
Dominican perspective on diplomacy. The new challenges to diplomacy offer countries without 
military or economic power a way to impact foreign public opinion through the application of soft 
power. Before I focus on the history of foreign affairs in the Dominican Republic, I present a brief 
overview of Latin American diplomacy and the reasons some countries of the region continue to 
face problems. One reason why countries like the Dominican Republic do not achieve high levels 
of soft power is because of the weak relationship between diplomacy and the state. For that reason, 
I claim that in order to live up to the new challenges of diplomacy, the Dominican Republic has to 
evaluate how diplomats and executives are managing foreign policy.  
In the second part of this chapter, I discuss the views of Mu-Kien Sang, who is an historian 
and an expert in Dominican international relations. Sang agrees with the analysis of the Dominican 
Republic’s diplomacy as “defensive” and she describes the different periods in the history of 
Dominican foreign relations. She highlights four stages in the diplomatic history from the 
dictatorship of Rafael Leonidas Trujillo (1930-1961), through the government of Leonel 
Fernández’s: Dominican Liberation Party (1996-2000, 2004-2012). At the end of this chapter, I 
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evaluate the last few years of Dominican diplomacy and discuss two instances where the national 
government implemented a reactionary diplomacy. This chapter seeks to unveil the changes that 
must be addressed in order to develop credible external relations in the Caribbean country.  
The Development of a New Diplomacy 
Global changes and technology have changed the conditions under which foreign relations 
are executed and developed, not only in the Dominican Republic but in all of Latin America. Mora 
and Hey (2003) analyze the diplomatic behavior in Latin American and Caribbean countries. They 
claim that one of the problems in Latin American and Caribbean foreign affairs is that the political 
culture in these countries allows for highly personalized administration, and also that the executive 
branch has a tendency towards authoritarian rule in foreign policy. Likewise, these authors find 
four spheres that together influence the effectiveness of the country’s foreign policies: (1) the 
idiosyncrasies of individual presidents, (2) the role of the domestic political institutions, (3) the 
role of civil society organizations, and (4) the conflict between each state and the structure of 
international organizations (Mora & Hey, 2003). 
        Mora and Hey (2003) make several important observations; the first one is about the 
abundant presence of the United States in the foreign policies of Latin American states. In that 
sense, the strong imperialistic presence is not implemented by force; instead, it is reinforced by 
aid and U.S. development policy. The anti-communist ideologies established by the US have been 
replaced by “…economic matters… as the fulcrum upon which core influence is pressed on [Latin 
America]” (Mora & Hey, 2003, p. 9). Mora and Hey’s second observation is that the presidents in 
Latin America designed a specific foreign policies agenda that highlights only national problems 
such as poverty, health and environmental difficulties instead of creating externally-oriented 
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foreign policies proposals. Moreover, another factor that the authors point out is the weakness of 
democracy and the institutions that affect the implementation of foreign policy in Latin American 
and Caribbean countries. 
        For all these reasons, many scholars urgently argue for a new concept of foreign policy. 
The new diplomacy seeks to integrate features of the old diplomacy with a new approach that 
integrates different actors of society to international audiences. It is no longer enough to promote 
a “message”, but rather weaker nations must build a relationship between domestic and 
international interests. . 
 
Cull highlights a horizontal projection, which allows a multilateral integration between the 
state and others actors. In contrast to the old form of doing diplomacy that was conducted in a 
bilateral form only between the states, “public diplomacy is a two-way street: a process of mutual 
influence, whereby a state (or other international player) facilitates engagement between publics 
or tunes its own policies to the map of foreign public opinion” (Cull, 2010, p. 12). 
Jan Melissen (2005) calls for a rethinking of diplomacy, and suggests that countries have 
a tension between traditional and new paradigms because the world has changed. Likewise, 
Melissen explains the importance of reorganizing diplomacy in such a way as to contemplate how 
people are more involved with global information technologies. These actions underline a 
transformation and a network approach in public diplomacy (Melissen, 2005, p. 29).  
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Figure 1. The Concept of New Public Diplomacy by Jan Melissen. 
*Graphic provided by the student for the purposes of this study 
 
 
Melissen proposes to move to another form of diplomacy where the government makes a 
connection with public affairs, and puts away the traditional form where diplomacy, which was 
only between states. The network model not only includes a soft power approach, but also focuses 
on the dialogue with foreign publics through non-governmental agents to promote and developing, 
the promotion of human rights, the spread of democratic values, good governance and the role of 
the media in civil society (Melissen, 2005, p. 22). 
The new diplomacy is extremely important because it integrates the use of soft power with 
civil society. Countries around the world can influence other countries without coercion or military 
interventions, but rather with persuasion. Melissen clarifies that people mistakenly believe that the 
role of soft power is only a mode of propaganda in other countries. But soft power is also the 
exercise of power over opinion in the international arena (Melissen, 2005). This new concept of 
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* Propaganda
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* Role of Non-Government Agents. 
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* The spread of democratic values.
* Good Governance. 
* The role of the media in civil 
society.
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diplomacy is not only relevant for state-to-state relations, as it was in the past; this new diplomacy 
also involves relations between the state and other actors in society.  
 
Another aspect of soft power is the state's credibility. Academics such as Craig Hayden 
(2012) examine the controversy around soft power in contemporary societies. Hayden formulates 
several questions to clarify any potential confusion about how to think about soft power and what 
its role is in international relations, and also to distinguish it from propaganda. Hayden points out 
that, “the simplicity of soft power‘s basic notion relies on some unelaborated assumptions about 
what counts as influence, persuasion, and the supposed values of symbolic and cultural attributes 
in relation to power” (Hayden, 2012, p. 28). Hayden also stresses that the concept is not only a 
combination of persuasion and attraction, but also is an exploration of how nation-states behave 
and create their agenda to achieve credibility in diplomacy through strong communication 
(Hayden, 2012).  
Dominican Foreign Affairs and Soft Power 
The challenges to Dominican diplomacy lie in the need to achieve a better understanding 
of soft power. Given its lack of hard power, the Dominican Republic can only compete with other 
countries in terms of public diplomacy through the use of soft power. Even though the country has 
strong foreign relations in terms of economic and cultural relations, it has to evaluate its political 
values and foreign policies. Joseph Nye (2004) describes the three important sources of soft power. 
The author points out that soft power is not only used to achieve cultural impact with external 
constituencies, but that it relies on political values and formal foreign policies. A strong democracy 
and the values of human rights are tools that can help to accomplish soft power.  
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According to Nye (2004), soft power fails when a government is disinterested in others’ 
opinions about its foreign policies. Another weakness in soft power comes from the incoherence 
of national and international policies, and/or the lack of credibility. These three factors are 
important for analyzing soft power in the Dominican Republic. 
The Dominican constitution contains some articles that frame the importance of foreign 
policies within its the national politics. However, the laws are often violated and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs has inadequate planning.  Pablo A. Mariñez, sociologist and former ambassador 
in Mexico, explains that the foreign policies of the Dominican Republic have been passive and 
only enacted to protect its position in the international community. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
is driven under international pressure or under decisions of the executive power (Mariñez, 2001). 
The defensive and reactionary foreign policies of the Dominican government today were 
implemented based on the 2010 Haiti Earthquake and the negative international reaction to the 
Dominican Republic’s response.  
The case of Dominican politics against Haiti is generally seen as a human rights failure. 
After the Haiti earthquake in 2010 the Dominican Republic implemented its bilateral relations with 
Haiti, and foreign affairs served as a collaborative path with the International Community. Even 
though the government prepared a plan for Haiti’s reconstruction, the tense relationship between 
the nations continued. Diplomacy failed because it was a short-term government reaction that was 
designed to put the Dominican and Haiti relations in a better position in front of the international 
community. I am not arguing that the Dominican Republic did not contribute humanitarian aid 
towards Haiti, or that the Dominican contributions were not valuable in Haiti’s reconstruction. 
However, what I claim is that the country’s foreign affairs approach demanded more strategic and 
long-term diplomacy, not a reactive diplomacy.  
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The criticism from the international media that the Dominican Republic is a racist country, 
should have urged the country to pay attention to foreign public opinion. Nicholas Cull points out 
that the first step in public diplomacy is not to speak, but to listen --“the best public diplomacy 
begins with listening: systematically collecting and analyzing the opinion of foreign publics” (Cull, 
2010). Instead of listening, the Dominican government began a counter-attack of a intensely 
nationalist discourse.  
  Philip Seib (1997) writes about how the media has a huge impact on foreign policy, 
explaining that this is a debate that permeates political communication. The debate is about who 
transforms the news: does the media shape the agenda of the government or do the policymakers 
transform the news? According to Seib, there is a semantic distinction between communication 
and politics. The news media impacts foreign policy, but other scholars claim that the media does 
not determine the response of the government to other countries (Seib, 1997, p. 139). The author 
clarifies and disagrees with theories which stress that the role of diplomacy “should not be 
subordinate to or transformed by public opinion” (Seib, 1997, p. xiii). On the contrary, Seib 
emphasizes that the stand of the news media has not changed and continues to affect the public 
opinion and the government’s decisions (Seib, 1997). Even though I am not describing the 
relationship between public diplomacy and the media, I argue that the media provides a challenge 
for Dominican diplomacy. However, in order to implement the new concept of public diplomacy 
Dominican government should first create a qualified Foreign Service staff. In order to do this they 
will have to dismantle the culture of patronage, corruption and illegality in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. 
In the following paragraphs, I highlight the reactive diplomacy and the weaknesses of the 
Dominican Foreign Affairs through a conversation with the Dominican historian Mu-Kien Sang.  
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A Brief Encounter with the Diplomatic History 
The academic Mu-Kien Sang describes the history of Dominican diplomacy. My questions 
for Sang (in our virtual encounter) were geared towards Dominican soft power, and I wanted to 
know her perspective about diplomacy in the country. Sang argues that Dominican diplomacy has 
not acquired clear guidelines for soft power: 
Dominican Foreign Affairs is characterized by the politics of the political parties that have 
predominated over national interests. The Foreign Ministry has a unique heritage that 
comes from the Reformist Party (PRSC) during the eight years of President Leonel 
Fernández’s term (Liberation Party, PLD). This made the ministry an institution guided by 
personal interest. Clientelism and favoritism are two of the most serious problems in our 
diplomacy (Interview and translation conducted by the author, 4 February 2016). 
Dominican diplomacy faces many challenges that I discuss in the next chapter. Likewise, 
Sang is concerned with four aspects in Dominican international relations: lack of professionalism, 
instability, lack of training in international politics, and policies defined in a personalistic way by 
the executive power. 
Sang also described diplomacy during the Trujillo dictatorship and the presidency of 
Leonel Fernández. She explained that foreign affairs in the country had two significant periods:  
The history of foreign policy in the Dominican Republic has changed a lot. I argue 
that before Trujillo, there was no real foreign policy by the Dominican State. During 
the 19th century, from 1844 to Trujillo, diplomacy in the country was only 
concerned with geopolitical interests, and not viewed as an opportunity for the 
Dominican state. For example, France, England, Spain and the United States were 
all competing for the market and for control of the Caribbean. These countries had 
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powerful consuls in the national territory; however, they only represented the 
international interests of those nations. 
A true foreign policy was developed during the Trujillo dictatorship, where 
diplomatic representation increased. The dictator believed that he needed to have 
open policies. Nevertheless, the main purpose of Trujillo’s strategy, in addition to 
seeking diplomatic representation, was his pursuit of espionage. For this reason the 
dictator designated key positions in the diplomatic corps for his right-hand men. 
Another clear element in the Trujillo international policy was the recruitment of 
people with a very high level of education. He recruited “la crème de la crème” of 
the Dominican intellectual class (Interview and translation conducted by the author, 
4 February 2016). 
Other academics point out that the foreign affairs of the Trujillo dictatorship occurred under 
the framework of the Good Neighbor Policy. The Good Neighbor Policy was active during the 
period between 1933 until 1943 when the United States modified its foreign policy in response to 
the rising threat in Europe. The new policy approach was framed around the idea of non-
intervention and respect for other countries’ domestic policies (Wood, 2010). This policy was 
exemplified when the dictator allied with Washington in its fight against Asian and European 
fascism. Trujillo's foreign policy was based on military and economic growth in the context of its 
alliance with the United States (Roorda, 1998). Likewise, Trujillo’s international strategies were 
elaborated to protect national sovereignty. The idea of national protection was a way to justify 
gaining more control over Dominicans and concealing human rights violations during the regime. 
Roorda (1998) points out that “Trujillo’s skillful handling of Dominican foreign relations allowed 
him to perpetrate his genocide of Haitian residents in the Dominican Republic in 1937” (Roorda, 
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1998, p. 4). This military alliance with the U.S helped him avoid being persecuted by the 
International Community for the Parsley Massacre. Trujillo manipulated the concept of “good 
neighbor” and manipulated foreign and domestic policies (Roorda, 1998, p. 89). 
Among the foreign affairs actions of the Trujillo dictatorship was the creation of several 
important institutions: the diplomatic school, through the Organic law of 1964; the participation 
of the Dominican Republic in the United Nations; and several signature international agreements 
(Cadette, 2015). Nevertheless, the violations of the regime transcended the national level and the 
dictator was accused of conspiring to murder and kidnap the Venezuelan president Romulo 
Betancourt and the writer Jesús Galíndez in the United States (Cadette, 2015). 
In my interview with Sang, the historian describes other periods of foreign policy. Sang points out 
that: 
 Another bright point of the Dominican foreign policy was, without doubt, the first 
four years of the Leonel Fernández government between 1996 and 2000. The 
country managed to break the inertia that the governments of Balaguer and the PRD 
had imposed (Interview and translation conducted by the author, 4 February 2016). 
Dominican foreign policy has had many ups and downs, and it has always been strongly 
influenced by nationalism, which did not allow for improving relations with Haiti. Instead 
nationalism has gotten in the way of formulating a coherent approach towards the United States 
and the European Union. According to Mora and Hey (2003) the Dominican Republic has 
attempted to move from nationalism to globalization. The authors examine the international 
policies during Joaquín Balaguer’ (Reformist Party, PRSC) and Leonel Fernández’s (Liberation 
Party, PLD) governments. The Balaguer government was passive and isolated, triggering the 
attention of the international community, due to the human rights violations committed against 
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Haitians. Balaguer faced the accusations with a “sovereignty discourse.” Mora and Hey (2003) 
describe Balaguer’s international relations during the Cold War, explaining that: 
Joaquín Balaguer flourished in this international environment since he was able to 
play to both domestic and international groups, satisfying the former by nationalist 
policies and economics and the latter by his staunch anticommunist position and by 
repressing the left. The end of the Cold War did not immediately affect much of 
official Dominican foreign policy since the isolationist, nationalist Balaguer 
remained in power until 1996, although changes occurred in the area of economics 
(Mora and Hey, 2003, p.105). 
By contrast, the new president, Leonel Fernández, was focused on security, the 
empowerment of multilateral institutions, and his initiative of hosting important summits in the 
country. At least initially, though, Leonel Fernández contributed to the development of the 
Dominican foreign affairs.  
Mora and Hey (2003) highlight that: 
… During the Fernández government, for the first time in thirty-one years, the 
Dominican government allowed the Interamerican Commission on Human Rights 
to visit the country. Fernández also improved diplomacy with the government of 
Haiti. He visited Haiti, addressed the Haitian parliament, and engaged in warmer 
relations with the government of Haiti. At the same time, improved relations 
between Haitians and Dominicans may be made more possible by the increased 
importance of diasporic communities from both countries in the domestic politics 
of their home countries  (Mora and Hey, 2003, p.115). 
  24 
Contemporary Dominican foreign policies changed the relationship to Haiti. Even though 
the society is still dealing with racism vis-a-vis its neighbor, Leonel Fernández contributed to the 
development of Dominican foreign affairs.  
Fernández made progress with regard to the Dominican response to international conflicts, 
but this was later criticized by the local media. Fernández, who has been called “the mediator,” 
helped to resolve some problems in other countries, such as the conflicts between Venezuela and 
Colombia, and the political crisis in Honduras. He also pushed the Dominican Republic to help in 
the reconstruction of Haiti after the earthquake in 2010. However Dominican public opinion 
accused Fernández of developing a personal diplomacy rather than a national diplomacy. 
Fernández was accused of pursuing his own interests over those of the country. Fernández formed 
a non-profit organization, the Global Foundation for Democracy and Development (GFDD), apart 
from his government. The organization is an international network, because it is located in the 
Dominican Republic, Washington and New York. His institution has been accused of receiving 
corrupt funds. 
A Present Overview of Dominican Foreign Affairs  
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has pursued the respect and recognition of the international 
community, forgetting its domestic problems. The question is: How can the country achieve 
pragmatism in diplomacy when it is dealing with serious institutional issues? Foreign relations 
should be geared not only toward improving international reputation, but also should involve 
listening to international voices. The ex-foreign minister, Carlos Morales Troncoso explained in 
the document "Our Foreign Relations" how the Dominican Republic has reached high levels of 
recognition through tourism and investment. However, these measurements of what has been 
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achieved by the Foreign Service are only attractive in terms of the country’s economy. In terms of 
diplomacy, the country has not yet been strategic. 
The Dominican Republic has expanded its foreign policy to other nations in Africa, the 
Middle East and Asia. Importantly, Morales (2012) points out that the country has served as an 
intermediary to handle conflicts in the region and has succeeded in restoring peace in some nations 
(Morales Troncoso, 2012). However, recognition and diplomatic expansion are not equal to 
execution, credibility and communication. Although the former are important in diplomatic 
matters, it is not possible to gain recognition when the national politics are incongruent. The 
following figure highlights the different factors that are important to influencing other countries. 
In 2015, the international community condemned the Dominican Republic’s racist policy 
of revoking the citizenship status of Dominicans of Haitian descent. International black 
movements added to this ‘destructive propaganda’ according to the Dominican government. 
However, the accusation of racism raises the question: was this really a campaign to discredit the 
country, or was this criticism the result of the mismanagement of national and international policy? 
International relations experts highlight the importance of state credibility and listening in foreign 
policy, and they say that in order for a country to achieve soft power in public diplomacy, the 
relationship between credibility and coherence must be well-defined.  
In reaction to the international condemnation, the Dominican Republic began to rethink its 
foreign policies. The Dominican government reacted, and countered the accusations of racism and 
once again prepared a new public diplomacy strategy. The “Strategic Plan 2015-2020: The New 
Foreign Relations Politics” summarizes the intentions of a new diplomacy and recognizes the 
institutions’ weaknesses in terms of its Haitians relations, and the Dominican Diaspora. The 
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current president, Danilo Medina, has claimed that the most important obstacles for Dominican 
public diplomacy goals are corruption and the lack of professionalism (MIREX, 2015). The 
proposal offers objectives and explains the new programs which will be used to achieve them. 
However, the new document ignores guidelines for how the programs will be executed. Once 
again, the Dominican government reacts, without deliberate planning.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I discussed the challenges to achieving a new concept of public diplomacy. 
Many governments in Latin America established a personalistic foreign policy and relied on weak 
democracies and institutions. Second, I highlighted the importance of a new framework for 
diplomacy that can be aligned with global changes. I argued that the new concept of public 
diplomacy, (which includes soft power) should not only be based be based on persuasion and 
cultural factors. It is essential for states to achieve credibility and interactivity between foreign 
publics and national publics.  
Furthermore, I presented the voices of many scholars, including an interview with the 
Dominican historian Mu-Kien Sang who explained that Dominican diplomacy has critical 
weaknesses, such as the absence of planning, lack of professionalism and clientelism. I focused on 
the history of Dominican foreign affairs by the discussing three different periods: the Trujillo 
dictatorship, and the governments of Joaquín Balaguer and Leonel Fernández.  
 The Trujillo dictatorship can be said to have been the “enlightenment period” of 
Dominican diplomacy because the tyrant created the first diplomatic school, the organic law and 
he recruited a professional diplomatic corps. Nonetheless, terror and human rights violations is 
what the country got in return.  
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The second period I described was the government of Joaquin Balaguer, which only dealt 
with the creation of a nationalist discourse that segregated the country. However, in the 
government of Leonel Fernández, foreign affairs expanded, and the country achieved a respectable 
international reputation. The Dominican Republic hosted summits and handled different conflicts 
with other countries in the region, despite the accusations that Fernández created a highly 
personalistic diplomacy. 
Lastly, I highlighted that in spite of these achievements, Dominican diplomacy is still 
passive and reacts only under international pressure. I stressed that a new form of diplomacy that 
includes soft power is urgently needed in the country because the government only reacts, and 
lacks a proactive strategy. An example of this is the recent creation of the “Strategic Plan 2015-
2020,” a project that seems to be a favorable path toward a new diplomacy. However, in order to 
achieve the plan, the nation has to analyze the structural problems within the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
A Political Introspection of how the Dominican Republic Constructed Foreign Policies 
 
Introduction 
“Dominican Republic has it all.” This is the slogan from the Tourism Ministry and it is 
intended to promote the island as a tourist paradise. While this campaign aims at presenting the 
beauty of the country’s beaches, mountains, and the friendliness of its people, it actually bears 
some deeper truth: the Dominican has indeed “everything,” from the most beautiful to the ugliest, 
and this slogan could as well point at those realities that are incongruent with the idea of “paradise.” 
The Dominican Republic has everything not only in terms of tourism, but also in terms of 
institutions. Importantly, the Dominican Republic has difficulty enforcing its own laws. In this 
chapter, I analyze the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an institution that impacts both national and 
international public opinion. Sticking with my metaphor, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also “has 
it all.” In fact, as I will argue here, this Ministry has become an incubator of corruption, political 
clientelism, and impunity.  
I examine patronage in the Dominican Republic’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I argue that 
the Dominican government is deeply implicated in patronage and personalistic clientelism. To 
prove this, I examine two payroll documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 2012-
2013 and 2015. Both of these documents evidence high levels of patronage. 
I point out that another variable involved in the failure of diplomacy is corruption. The 
“Blue Book” of the United Nations reveals that the country has more UN delegates than Mexico, 
or Argentina or Brazil. Likewise, in the document Corruption Perceptions Index 2014, published 
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by Transparency International, the Dominican Republic ranks 115 in its overall governmental 
corruption, placing it behind other countries with much larger populations, such as Mexico, Brazil 
and Colombia. 
I highlight that the main characteristic of most Dominican governmental institutions is not 
the creation of documents or more laws; it is the culture of law-breaking by politicians and citizens. 
Even though at times the creation of new projects seems to be a good initiative in the context of 
public diplomacy, in most cases there is a lack of execution. As a result, the distance between the 
law and reality is a serious problem in the context of diplomacy. Additionally, I assess the different 
laws that govern the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, such as Article 146 from the Constitution, the 
314 Organic Law in 1964, and the Protocol for Transparency and Institution signed by the current 
Dominican president, Danilo Medina. In conclusion, I indicate the importance of having a 
resolution which provides more accountability and allows for more progress in diplomacy in the 
Dominican Republic. 
Patronage in the Dominican Republic has restricted a new generation of professionals and 
in the process has damaged the promotion of external relations. Strong diplomacy implies the 
necessity of a government, which communicates with foreign publics in an attempt to “bring about 
understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national 
goals and policies” (Melissen, 2005, p. 12). The Dominican government needs to face the culture 
of patronage because of the negative impact it has on the foreign policies of the country.  The 
assignment of jobs to an inexperienced candidate, only for him to acquire votes and personal 
connections, emphasizes patronage. 
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Electoral Coalition Building: The Beginning of Favor  
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the result of vote donations for political favors and jobs. 
Alliances between the minority political groups with the majority political parties in the Dominican 
Republic have only reflected the culture of patronage in the country. This exchange of votes for 
favors and political positions fragments national institutions in general, and blocks the exercise of 
effective diplomacy.  
The desperation for victory allows political party clientelism, and the Dominican Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs is a clear example of this. The Dominican economist and expert on international 
relations, Gedeon Santos describes Dominican foreign policy as reflecting the characteristics of 
“our underdevelopment, isolation and lack of institutional improvisation” (Santos, 2013, p. 1). 
Santos stresses that the foreign policy of the country has been formed primarily for the purpose of 
creating diplomatic jobs.  
However, Santos also highlights that patronage in the Ministry came following the Trujillo 
regime, because during the dictatorship foreign policy had a consistent and aggressive role in the 
international arena (Santos, 2013). The main reason for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ lack of 
strong policies is corruption and political party clientelism. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has 
been a vehicle for power seekers who obtain their positions through personal and political 
connections. 
Because of political ambitions and the desire to win elections, Dominican candidates 
started to form alliances between political parties. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs became a 
recruitment institution for politicians who formed strategic alliances to obtain jobs. Even though 
the Dominican Republic has more than twenty political parties, only three can be considered 
“major parties.” However, the three political parties: the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD), 
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Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), and the Social Christian Reformist Party (PRSC) have 
made alliances amongst themselves to obtain power, and have fostered political patronage. 
Wilfredo Lozano explains that after the death of the three principal political leaders and founders 
of the three major parties (Juan Bosch (PLD), Francisco Peña Gómez (PRD) and Joaquín Balaguer 
(PRSC)), the political parties experienced transformation and party fragmentation (Lozano, 2010). 
Lozano stresses that the party systems and the state have a relationship of 
“neopatrimonialism and clientelism performance” on the electoral structure (Lozano, 2010). One 
of the reasons these new parties donate their votes is because it has been difficult for them to obtain 
power through their own parties. Edward Gonzalez-Acosta defines vote buying as a strategy of 
political clientelism (Gonzalez-Acosta, 2008). Likewise, Acosta highlights that the bartering of 
votes and public resources and services is part of a system that reinforces subordination. As Acosta 
indicates, “the logic of clientelism, in essence is that the winner will favor those who supported 
him/her, and those that did not will find a ‘closed’ door when they go knocking for help” 
(Gonzalez-Acosta, 2008, p. 1). 
In addition, Richard Graham (1990) explains that there is a similarity between generosity 
and power. Graham highlights that there is a relationship between rewards, loyalty and obedience 
in the political institutions that were implemented during the colonial period (Graham, 1990). 
Particularly in the case of the Dominican Republic, the patterns of patronage have not changed 
because new politicians do not have sufficient influence to gain power, and their votes are used 
for their own economic ends. As a result, “clientelism has replaced ideology as the organizing 
principle of party politics in the Dominican Republic, and the former Marxist left has also taken 
part in this. Several tiny leftist groups have formed electoral alliances with the PRD or the PLD, 
mostly in exchange for clientelistic favors” (Jana, et al., 2008, p. 28). 
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An example of electoral alliance is described by the Dominican historian Roberto Cassa in 
the article “Negotiated Elections,” he explains that the “Pact of Democracy” was a document that 
reduced Joaquín Balaguer’s term to two years and authorized a new process of elections in 1996. 
In that sense, the pact forced the end of the presidential term of Balaguer who had been in power 
for over twenty-two years. Secondly, the Pact of Democracy also altered the Dominican 
Constitution and proposed that in order to win the elections of 1996, the new candidate had to win 
50 percent of the votes.  
The confirmation of this treaty and the changes to the Constitution opened the doors for 
alliances and political fragmentation. Cassa explains that with the pact in 1996, Balaguer explored 
a new plan to leave the presidential seat without entirely giving up political power --“in the 
meantime, he prepared the greatest number of obstacles to prevent the predicted triumph of the 
PRD in 1996” (Cassá, 1997, p. 20). Balaguer prepared an alliance with the elected candidate 
Leonel Fernández from the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD) because he opposed his own party’s 
candidate. Fernández won the elections in 1996 with the help of Balaguer, but his presidency was 
at the same time full of political commitments to the PRSC, including an agreement to hand over 
control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
 
Patronage in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
The culture of patronage in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is rooted in the alliance between 
the Social Christian Reformist Party (PRSC) and the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD). The 
positions of the PRSC foreign ministers were the result of a political transition and clientelism. 
Carlos Morales Troncoso was the vice president between 1986- 1994 in the government of 
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Balaguer (PRSC). Subsequently, Morales Troncoso was also chancellor of the country during two 
periods: 1994-1996 and 2004-2014 during the Fernández (PLD) governments. 
The following table represents the list of different chancellors of the Dominican Republic. 
The table shows that members of the Reformist Party (PRSC) managed the Foreign Ministry 
during the governments of the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD) after the Pact of Democracy, 
which established a strategic alliance. 
Table 1. List of Dominican Chancellors 
 
Government Years Chancellors Political Party 
PRSC 1994-1996 Carlos Morales Troncoso PRSC 
PRSC 1996 Caonabo Javier Castillo PRSC 
PLD 1996-2000 Eduardo Latorre Rodríguez PRSC 
PRD 2000-2003 Hugo Tolentino Dipp PRD 
PRD 2003-2004 Frank Guerrero Pratss PRD 
PLD 2004-2014 Carlos Morales Troncoso PRSC 
PLD 2014-Present Andres Navarro PLD 
 
   *Table provided by the author for the purposes of this study 
 
 
The table represents the years of political patronage after the alliance between Joaquín 
Balaguer and Leonel Fernández in 1996. Fernández won the elections with the collaboration of 
Balaguer and most of the ministers were from the PRSC party, with the exception of the four years 
when the Revolutionary Dominican Party (PRD) ruled. Fernández had a political commitment for 
fourteen years, and it was after the death of Carlos Morales Troncoso in 2014 and under a new 
mandate with Danilo Medina (PLD) that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs obtained a chancellor of 
his own political party. 
The 2013 list of diplomatic corps employees in the Dominican Republic has 1,584 
members. However, this data analysis is based on the 330 officials who were identified by name. 
I show here how patronage is evident in the 2013 payroll. The list shows that 105 State Department 
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employees were members of the Reformist Party PRSC, and that senator Felix Bautista 
recommended 101, including family members and political allies. And additional 85 of them were 
cousins, spouses and family members of civil servants and former presidents. 
 
 
  
Figure 2. Officials Identified by Name in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Acento.com.do, 2014) 
*Graphic provided by the author for the purposes of this study 
 
 
               
 
 
Figure 3. Officials Identified by Name in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
*Graphic provided by the author for the purposes of this study 
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These graphics show that in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs there is a culture of patronage 
with the exchange of political favors for votes. The 2013 MOFA payroll shows that 32% of the 
employees were from the Reformist Party (PRSC), and 30% of the employees were recommended 
by the Senator Felix Bautista, including not only his family members, but also of employees who 
supported the Dominican Liberation Party in New York. Twenty-six percent of the identified 
officials were recommended by civil servants and former presidents and 12% were registered on 
the list without salary. 
In addition, the list below demonstrates the strategic partnerships and the exchange of votes 
for political jobs between the Reformist Party (PRSC) and the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD) 
and in the Dominican consular service around the world. 
 
Table 2. Part of the List of Reformist Officials in Embassies, Payroll 2012-2013 published by 
the digital newsletter, Acento.com.do, which has a tremendous impact on the Dominican public 
opinion. The media has a group of intellectuals, academics and experts who are well known as 
critical writers (Acento.com.do, 2014).  
 
No. NAME POSITION COUNTRY 
1 
VIRGILIO ALVAREZ 
BONILLA 
AMBASSADOR BILATERAL 
COMMISSION 
DOM. REP- PUERTO 
RICO 
2 FLORENTINO CARVAJAL 
AMBASSADOR BILATERAL 
COMMISSION 
DOM. REP- PUERTO 
RICO 
3 
RICARDO ALBERTO 
ALMONTE MINISTER COUNSELOR CANADA 
4 
FRANCISCA MATILDE 
FRIAS MINISTER COUNSELOR ECUADOR 
5 
HERNANI ABRAHAM 
AQUINO MINISTER COUNSELOR NICARAGUA 
6 DIEGO VALLEJO RAMIREZ MINISTER COUNSELOR NICARAGUA 
  
*Table provided by the author for the purposes of this study (official list on Appendix) 
 
 
  36 
The table shows how electoral support can be seen in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The 
patterns of loyalty and obedience in relation to protection and support for political parties are signs 
of how patronage permeates Dominican institutions. Richard Graham explains the concept of 
positions as rewards, as the “conservative use of patronage”. This form of “prizes and rewards” 
has an impact on voters because it controls the voting process through manipulation (Graham, 
1990, p. 93). 
 
Similarly, the 2013 payroll of the Foreign Service shows that many personnel are family 
members, people recommended by senators and deputies, and people who have not had any 
diplomatic experience.  
The document describes the position, wages, and reveals who they are and by whom the 
person was recommended to occupy a position within the institution.  
Table 3. Part of the List Recommended by Ministers, Senators or Deputies in Embassies, Payroll 
2012-2013. (Acento.com.do, 2014). 
 
No. NAME POSITION/COUNTRY OBSERVATION 
1 
CELESTE 
FRANCISCA 
JIMENEZ 
 
CONSUL/CALIFORNIA,UNITED 
STATES 
SISTER OF RADHAMES 
JIMENEZ, ATTORNEY 
GENERAL 
2 
JOSELYNE 
ROSARIO 
ROMERO GENERAL-CONSUL/ARUBA 
WIFE OF RAFAEL 
NUNEZ,FORMER 
PRESIDENTIAL 
SPOKESPERSON 
3 
VICENTE 
ALFONSO 
BENGOA 
ARAGUIZ 
AUXILIARY/BARCELONA, 
SPAIN 
SON OF VICENTE BENGOA, 
FINANCE MINISTER 
4 
YESSICA 
ALEJANDRINA 
SOSA GERMAN 
AUXILIARY/BOSTON, UNITED 
STATES 
DAUGHTER OF AMBASSADOR 
JOSE SOSA AND 
RECOMMENDED BY 
ALEJANDRINA GERMAN, 
FORMER MINISTER OF 
EDUCATION 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
No. NAME POSITION/COUNTRY OBSERVATION 
5 
CARMEN 
VIRGINIA 
CARDONA GENERAL-CONSUL/CURACAO 
DAUGHTER OF LIGIA AMADA 
MELO, MINISTER OF 
EDUCATION 
6 
ANDREA 
ALTAGRACIA 
MEDINA  
GENERAL-CONSUL/ 
GUADALUPE 
COUSIN OF DANILO MEDINA, 
CURRENT PRESIDENT OF THE 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
7 
LUISA VIOLETA 
SANTANA 
JIMENEZ 
VICE-CONSUL/MONTREAL, 
CANADA 
RECOMMENDED BY LUIS 
MANUEL BONETTI, 
ADMINISTRATIVE SECRETARY 
OF THE PRESIDENCY (PLD) 
 
*Table provided by the author for the purposes of this study (Official List on Appendix) 
 
Corruption in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
The Dominican government has much documented corruption within the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. The current president Danilo Medina signed an anti-corruption agreement with 
the international organization Transparency International. However, I demonstrate that all of the 
Dominican presidents have maintained a silent position vis-à-vis corruption for decades, and the 
nation is still plagued with corruption. One symptom of this is that the state positions are not given 
by merit.  As a consequence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been an institution formed in a 
context of extreme corruption. The Dominican Republic is more corrupt than other countries with 
larger populations such as Colombia, Mexico and Brazil (Corruption Perceptions Index, 2014).  
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Another example of corruption within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is presented in the 
Blue Book of the United Nations where the Dominican delegation has 77 members, which is far 
greater than Argentina, which has 10; Brazil with 33 and Colombia which has 57 (United Nations, 
2015).    
This means that the Dominican Republic, with a total population of some 10 million, has 
seven times more UN diplomats on its payroll than Argentina, whose total population is some 46 
million and more than double the number from Brazil, with a population of over 200 million 
people. In other words, in the Dominican Republic there is one UN diplomat for every 129,870 
citizens, whereas in Brazil, there is one UN diplomat for every 6,060,606 Brazilians. UN diplomats 
are, however, just the tip of the proverbial iceberg. Why, then, is the Dominican government 
spending so much of its (scarce) financial resources on diplomats? 
 
High Levels of Corruption in 2013 and 2015 Payrolls  
Another peculiarity of the payroll is the excessive wages garnered by some of the 
ambassadors. An example is the case of the journalist Cesar Medina, who earned $480,000 USD, 
in 2012-2013 (Acento.com.do, 2014). Medina exceed by 16.67% the base wage of the president 
of the United States, Barack Obama which is USD$400,000.00 per year (Kottasova & Pendergrass, 
2015). 
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Table 4. The Best Paid in the Dominican Foreign Ministry, Payroll 2012-2013 (Acento.com.do, 
2014). 
 
  
NAME POSITION COUNTRY SALARY 
1 CESAR MEDINA ABREU AMBASSADOR SPAIN-MADRID USD$480,000.00 
2 PEDRO VERGES AMBASSADOR JAPAN-TOKYO USD$480,000.00 
3 
HANS DANNENBERG 
CASTELLANOS AMBASSADOR INDIA-NEW DELHI USD$414,000.00 
4 LAURA FAXAS AMBASSADOR FRANCE-PARIS USD$384,000.00 
5 
RUBEN ARTURO SILIE 
VALDEZ AMBASSADOR 
HAITI-PORT-AU-
PRINCE USD$360,000.00 
6 VINICIO TOBAL URENA AMBASSADOR ITALY-ROME USD$360,000.00 
7 
MARIA GABRIELA BONNETI 
ROSSELLINI AMBASSADOR EGYPT-CAIRO USD$324,000.00 
8 ALEXANDER DE LA ROSA AMBASSADOR ISRAEL-TEL AVIV USD$300,000.00 
9 JOSE TOMAS ARES GERMAN AMBASSADOR JAMAICA-KINGSTON USD$264,000.00 
10 ANIBAL DE CASTRO AMBASSADOR 
UNITED STATES-
WASHINGTON USD$298,134.48 
11 
RENE BIENVENIDO 
SANTANA GONZALEZ AMBASSADOR 
GUATEMALA-
GUATEMALA USD$221,040.00 
12 
JOSE OSVALDO LEGER 
AQUINO AMBASSADOR 
HONDURAS-
HONDURAS USD$192,000.00 
 
*Table provided by the author for the purposes of this study (Official List on Appendix) 
 
 
Corruption within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has created a huge hole in the country’s 
budget. Dominican ambassadors earned more than Mexican ambassadors. According to the 
newspaper Nacional from Mexico in 2013, the Mexican ambassador in Spain earned 
USD$145,113.36; 300% less than the Dominican ambassador (Agencia Reforma, 2013). Most 
Dominican officials earned more money than Mexican officials in 2013 
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Table 5. Wages of Dominican Ambassadors versus Mexican Ambassadors. 
 
COUNTRY 
DOMINICAN 
AMBASSADOR 
MEXICAN 
AMBASSADORS 
SPAIN USD$480,000.00 USD$145,113.36 
JAPAN USD$480,000.00 USD$166,907.52 
INDIA USD$414,000.00 USD$108,209.88 
FRANCE USD$384,000.00 USD$133,837.32 
ITALY USD$360,000.00 USD$145,113.36 
EGYPT USD$324,000.00 USD$114,000.00 
ISRAEL USD$300,000.00 USD$115,861.80 
 
*Table provided by the author for the purposes of this study 
The Mexican list was reported not only by the Mexican media, but also by the Mexican 
Treasury Department and published in 2015, because local Mexican media reported that the 
ambassadors from most countries earned more than the country presidents where they are located 
in many cases. However, it is still not clear why Dominican ambassadors earned more than the 
Mexican ambassadors. Mexico has more impact in the international community than does the 
Dominican Republic (Treasury, 2015).  
Another list that the media collected is the list of the people who the senator Felix Bautista 
recommended to work in the institution. The list points out that the senator recommend 101 people 
to be part of the Dominican consulate. Most of the members are from the PLD Political 
Commission in New York, and/or family members of the senator. 
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Table 6. Recommended by the Senator Felix Bautista, Payroll 2012-2013 (Acento.com.do, 
2014). 
 
No. NAME POSITION/COUNTRY OBSERVATION 
1 IRMA BAUTISTA 
GENERAL CONSUL/CANARY 
ISLANDS, SPAIN 
SISTER OF FELIX 
BAUTISTA 
2 
VANTROI ILIENOV 
PENA 
VICE-CONSUL/CANARY 
ISLANDS, SPAIN 
NEPHEW OF FELIX 
BAUTISTA 
3 CARLOS GONZALEZ VICE- CONSUL/PANAMA 
KARINA'S HUSBAND 
(FELIX BAUTISTA) 
4 MILEDIS MARTINEZ VICE-CONSUL/PUERTO RICO 
COUSIN OF FELIX 
BAUTISTA 
5 
CARLOS MANUEL 
SANCHEZ ASENSIO VICE-CONSUL/SAINT MARTIN 
RECOMMENDED BY 
FELIX BAUTISTA 
6 
GUILLERMO DE JESUS 
ANGELES VICE-CONSUL/SEVILLE 
RECOMMENDED BY 
FELIX BAUTISTA 
7 TERESITA PENA VICE-CONSUL/PUERTO RICO 
RECOMMENDED BY 
FELIX BAUTISTA 
8 ARISTIDES BAUTISTA VICE-CONSUL/PUERTO RICO 
FELIX BAUTISTA'S 
BROTHER 
9 
LUZ DEL CARMEN 
RAMOS PUJOLS VICE-CONSUL/PUERTO RICO 
RECOMMENDED BY 
FELIX BAUTISTA'S 
BROTHER 
 
 *Table provided by the author for the purposes of this study (Official List on Appendix) 
 
 
 
Felix Bautista is accused by International Transparency of illegally obtaining funds from 
the state. The organization through the campaign “Unmask the Corrupt” points out that the senator 
obtained a personal fortune through “money laundering, abuse of power, prevarication and illicit 
enrichment” (Transparency International, 2016). The detection of irregularities and corruption in 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by international and national media have forced the Dominican 
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government to reorganize the problems associated with diplomats’ payrolls and make a significant 
reduction in wages in the diplomatic corps in 2015, but not in the total number of employees.  
Ghost Payroll: No-Show Jobs 
The government is not dealing with diplomatic corruption; however, the minister Andrés 
Navarro recognized that “diplomats do not work, but continued to receive a wage” (Reyes, 2015). 
Similarly, the minister points out that in 2015, 1,200 positions were removed, but during the 
research I found that the goal has not been fulfilled. In 2012, the Dominican Foreign Ministry had 
1,163 officials. In 2013, the Foreign Service had 1,584 member; in 2014 1,396; in August 2015 
1,436 and in February of 2016 1,416 officials.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Amount of Members in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013-2016 (Santana, 2016). 
*Graphic elaborated by the author, 25 March 2016 
 
The graphic shows that after the scandal in 2013, there was only a reduction of 188 
officials. However, the following years their numbers increased again. What is most notable is that 
in September of 2015, the foreign minister Andrés Navarro communicated again that 400 consuls’ 
positions were removed because the country had “inflated missions of staff and other problems” 
(Moreno, 2015)”. This statement indicates that there is an empty discourse, because the 400 
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officials or the 1,200 positions never were removed according to the 2016 payroll. Instead, the 
2016 payroll has 16 more members. 
 
Additionally, I found that the new payroll in 2015 raises many questions regarding the new 
salaries. Examples of this are the low wages for an auxiliary in Belgium, Spain, Italy or Boston, 
who earns $920.00 dollars per month. This amounts to $11,040.00 per year, which is under 
$15,080 per year – the minimum wage for a full time worker in the United States (Center for 
Poverty Research, 2015). In a phone interview, Laury Sánchez (who works in the Department of 
Human Resources in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Santo Domingo) explains that “auxiliary” 
positions are granted by administrative and decree forms, and that they work regular hours. The 
Dominican Consulate in New York works from 9:00 am to 3:30 pm, while the Consulate in Boston 
works from 9:00 am to 6:00 pm (Santana, 2016). 
 
Table 7. Auxiliary Positions, Foreign Affairs Payroll 2015  
 
NAME POSITION CONSULATE SALARIO 
ANTOLINA DISLA 
GARCIAS 
AUXILIARY 
DOMINICAN CONSULATE IN 
AMBERES,BELGICA 
USD$11,040.00 
GERALDO DE JESUS 
GUZMAN RAMIREZ 
AUXILIARY 
DOMINICAN CONSULATE IN  
ATHENS,GREECE 
USD$11,040.00 
MINERVINA 
MATILDES FLORIAN 
FERRERAS 
AUXILIARY 
DOMINICAN CONSULATE IN 
BARCELONA, SPAIN 
USD$11,040.00 
CRISTINA 
ALTAGRACIA 
GONZALEZ HERNAND 
AUXILIARY 
DOMINICAN CONSULATE IN 
BOSTON, UNITED STATES 
USD$11,040.00 
SOLLY PATRICIA 
DURAN OVALLES 
AUXILIARY 
DOMINICAN CONSULATE IN 
BOSTON, UNITED STATES 
USD$11,040.00 
SIRIACO CABRERA 
RODRIGUEZ 
AUXILIARY 
DOMINICAN CONSULATE IN 
FRANCKFURT, GERMANY 
USD$11,040.00 
*Table provided by the author for the purposes of this study  
 
The salaries could express political favoritism. The 2015 payroll, while highlighting a 
reduction in wages, also point out the inferior wages in cities such as Boston, Athens and Madrid. 
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The new reduction of these wages in 2015 does not propose an improvement in political 
clientelism. In contrast, the low remuneration can lead to the conclusion that officials are not 
working in the countries where they should be exercising diplomacy. The former Dominican 
ambassador to Washington reveals that the “United States and Spanish consular officers received 
paychecks and never left the country” (Romero, 2014, p. 1). 
The Ministry has been listed as an institution whose employees have been termed "empty 
bottles" that rely on nepotism and cronyism, a perspective, which has damaged the reputation of 
diplomacy.  
Another example of corruption in the 2015 payroll is how counselors in the Dominican 
embassy in London have the same position and different salaries and representation expenses.  
Table 8. Counselors’ Positions, Foreign Affairs Payroll 2015 
RELINDA VASQUEZ 
ALMONTE COUNSELOR 
DOMINICAN 
EMBASSY IN 
LONDON 1,600.00 1,600.00 
JOSUE ANTINOE 
FIALLO 
PORTORREAL COUNSELOR 
DOMINICAN 
EMBASSY IN 
LONDON 3,000.00 6,500.00 
MARIA CAROLINA 
DIONISIA CASTRO 
DIAZ COUNSELOR 
DOMINICAN 
EMBASSY IN 
LONDON 1,600.00 2,600.00 
ARALIS MERCEDES 
RODRIGUEZ 
COLLADO COUNSELOR 
DOMINICAN 
EMBASSY IN 
LONDON 1,600.00 3,212.00 
 
*Table provided by the author for the purposes of this study  
 
This table shows a wage variation between officials and suggests that even though the 
Ministry reduced the wages, the institution does not have a standard wage for the same position 
(MIREX,2015).  
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Rosario Adames (2012) demonstrates that many Dominican diplomats spend most of their 
time in the Dominican Republic. In many embassies and consular offices, delegates are only 
present sporadically and in some places they are asked not to show up at all because they have no 
space to seat them.  Adames highlights that “it is common for ambassadors to have spouses, 
children or other relatives appointed as diplomatic or consular servers in the same country where 
they are accredited” (Adames, 2012). The risk of nepotism generates discrimination and does not 
open the doors for professionalism in the state institutions.  
 
The Struggle between Law and Reality  
“ I believe that we are acting, thinking, conceiving and trying to 
go on making not a real country, but one of paper. 
The Constitution, the laws… everything… is magnificent, 
everything on paper. It has no connection with reality” 
(Gabriel García Marquez, quoted in Reiter 2013, p. 142) 
 
Among the reasons that the DR has failed in diplomatic matters is also the breach of laws 
that violate existing documents such as the Article 146 in the Dominican Constitution, the 
“Protocol of Transparency”. The second reason is the lack of interest in implementing a “new 
Organic Law” in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that could facilitate better public diplomacy. The 
existing Organic Law was created in 1964 and was not changed until 2011. Bernd Reiter (2013) 
explains that when elites come to benefit from their positions, society begins to lose their trust in 
the political system, because politicians do not represent the interests of the citizens. Instead, 
politicians govern to satisfy their own interests rather than what the people need. Reiter stresses, 
there are “…tensions and contradictions, and on the ways different people and groups have sought 
to uphold and defend their citizens” (Reiter, 2013, p. xvi). In Dominican Republic the laws are 
placed aside. 
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Dominicans politicians perceive the laws as largely rhetorical. The tendency of certain 
Dominican politicians to change the laws at their convenience is the product of a political heritage 
from Joaquín Balaguer. In that sense, the path from dictatorship through a democratic regime in 
Dominican Republic was incomplete and has affected how Dominicans perceive their institutions. 
Ana Liberato (2013) examines how Joaquin Balaguer is still remembered in the Dominican society 
through his “authoritarian pedagogies” (Liberato, 2013). 
The phrase that Balaguer used about the Constitution (that it is just “a simple paper”) had 
a tremendous impact on the political behavior of both elites and citizens for years afterwards. As 
Liberato points out, “the way Dominican society deals with its past affects…their moral authority 
and how [the society] struggles for transparency, accountability, inclusion and greater justice and 
human rights develop in the country” (Liberato, 2013, p. 8). Moreover, Liberato stresses that the 
consequences of Balaguer’s legacy have had repercussions for the practice of citizenship and their 
confidence in democratic institutions. Equally important is the analysis of the double discourse of 
Balaguer when politicians refer to the laws. The sociologist Rosario Espinal establishes a 
comparative analysis in the political mentalities of the dictator Rafael Leonidas Trujillo and 
Joaquín Balaguer. The author points out that both leaders proclaim the law and the exercising of 
the rules, and modify laws according to their own benefits (Espinal, 1994). 
The relationship between law and reality in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also 
explained by the minister Andrés Navarro, who emphasizes, “the problem of the Dominican 
Republic is not resources, but institutions” (Pina, 2014, p. 1). This statement underlines that the 
national government has a clear position on the problem, but the political rhetoric is stronger than 
the execution.  
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The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has laws that reinforce the importance of a diplomatic 
career; however, the reality is that the laws concerning the exercise of their functions in the Foreign 
Service are far from reality. Bernd Reiter (2013) highlights that laws in Latin American countries 
are created to obtain recognition with foreign audiences. Reiter discusses that “by passing beautiful 
laws and signing international conventions that are then either not enforced, or actively violated, 
the…government is able to garner international legitimacy and thus substitute it for democratic 
internal legitimacy” (Reiter, 2013, p. 142). The reality is that laws are established in the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, but then the government ignores the laws and the internal problems and bolsters 
a national discourse that leads the country to present itself as a victim of foreign attacks. The laws 
are not applied or they are changed, following the needs and wishes of those in command. 
The contradictions between law and reality in Dominican Republic, particularly in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, become apparent upon examining three important documents: Article 
146 of the Constitution, the Organic Law in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Protocol of 
Transparency. These legally-binding documents all outline the way foreign policy should be 
implemented. I scrutinized the content of these legal documents and found that there is a large gap 
between what Dominicans have in the way of legal protection, and what the officials are executing 
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
Evaluation of the Laws that Govern the Foreign Office 
Article 146  
The Dominican Constitution provides the legal basis that governs all of its public institutions. The 
Dominican Constitution condemns all forms of corruption in the organs of the state. Likewise, the 
law specifies that there are sanctions for any person who removes public funds or obtains economic 
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benefits from the state. The law clearly establishes sanctions for corruption and indicates penalties 
such as the “civil degradation and restitution of its functions” (Dominican Constitution, 2011). 
Article 146.-Prohibition of corruption. It is condemned all form of corruption across the organs of 
the State. In consequence: 1) shall be punished with the penalties that the law determines, any person 
that subtracts public funds or that because of their positions within the organs and agencies of the 
state, its dependencies or institutions, get for himself or for a third party economic gain; (2) in the 
same way will be punished the person who provides advantages partners, family,close friends, 
friends or related; Constitution of the Dominican Republic 84 (3) it is mandatory, in accordance 
with the provisions of the law, the affidavit of assets of the public servants, who corresponds always 
test the origin of their goods, before and after duties or at the request of the competent authority; 
(4) it will be applied to persons convicted of crimes of corruption, without prejudice to other 
penalties provided for by law, the penalty civic degradation, and is required for appropriate 
restitution unlawfully (Dominican Constitution, 2011). 
 
In the Dominican Republic, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been an institution that the 
government uses to benefit a group of people who contributed to the campaigns of elected officials. 
Some diplomats benefit themselves from their duties and establish business relationships in other 
countries for their own benefit. Article 146 is clear when it points out that the consequences of 
patronage “will result in punishment of the person who provides advantages to partners, family, 
close friends, friends or related” (Dominican Constitution, 2011). 
 One example of how Article 146 is violated is found in the 2013 payroll and the recent 
case of the Dominican diplomat in United Nations, Francis Lorenzo, who was arrested and accused 
of participating in an international corruption scandal. The scandal involves other diplomats, 
including the former president of the General Assembly John Ashe (CNN, 2015). However, the 
penalties for the diplomat Francis Lorenzo continue in a limbo. Some Dominican organizations 
have demanded that he be ordered to return 100% of his personal wealth to the state. According to 
the Dominican activists for the “Country Alliance” in New York, the case of this Dominican 
diplomat highlights the importance of establishing the rule of law in the diplomatic and consular 
corps, extracting all the officials without functions and designating persons for their merit and 
capacity, not for their political militancy (Nuevo Diario, 2015).  
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Organic Law 314 and the New Law in 2011 
Organic Law 314’s an obsolete law that outlines a traditional form of diplomacy instead of 
a new diplomacy. For more than 45 years, the Foreign Ministry was ruled by the same law without 
any transformation or revision. The Ministry law has not changed since 1964 and this reveals a 
diplomatic stagnation, a limited interest of the executive power to regulate and supervise the law, 
and the legal heritage of Balaguer in Dominican politics. Secondly, the proposal of the New 
Organic Law bolstered in 2011 was approved by the Chamber of Senators in 2012, but it is still’s 
waiting for the support of the Chamber of Deputies. The local newspaper Diario Libre (2015) 
reported that even though the chamber approved other important laws, the new Organic Law 
remains awaiting approval (Diario Libre, 2015). 
If and when it is ratified, the new Organic Law will allow for some improvement. An 
example of this is in article 56, which establishes a “Career Council” that will evaluate and dismiss 
any diplomats who the council demonstrates as incompetent in the exercise of their functions. The 
new law creates the council; however, the old document in article 27 establishes that the expulsion 
of a diplomat must be due to ‘serious offenses’. And it remains unclear in both laws who 
determines what the severe violations will be, and who will determine when they are committed. 
(MIREX, 2016)  
Article 56.  1) Abandonment of their duties 2) By Criminal Conviction 3) Incompetence in the 
exercise of their functions 4) Qualified deficient in three successive qualifications 5) Proven 
inappropriate behavior. Note: The Career Council is who will establish an objective investigation 
of the imputed facts (House of Representatives, 2011). 
 
Another problem with this new council is that it does not specify who should carry out the 
evaluations. To be effective, different groups of the Dominican society should be involved, not 
only politicians. Citizens need to demand a more thorough execution of the law and clarity about 
how the government spends its money.  
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The Press and Law Foundation requests that the executive impose drastic sanctions against 
diplomats who refuse to produce a declaration of assets as mandated by the law, because this 
situation affects the image of the country and the government (7 días.com.do, 2015). Bernd Reiter 
(2013) argues that the changes in the legal frameworks do not transform social realities, but only 
add a promise of change (Reiter, 2013).  As Reiter stresses, “weak states are weak because they 
lack legitimacy and thus cannot count on the compliance of their citizens, thus making it costly to 
enforce the rule of law and order” (Reiter, 2013, p. 184). However, in some of the cases it is not a 
lack of resources, but the misuse of the resources for the benefit of political leaders. The next 
document that I discuss is an example of how the state’s resources are being used for the interests 
of political elites, thereby increasing patronage and corruption. In addition, I analyze how the 
presidential candidates forget about laws and leave aside the commitment to implement them. 
The Protocol for Transparency and Institutions 
The Protocol for Transparency and Institutions is a document in which the current 
Dominican president Danilo Medina has pledged to comply with in order to regulate the role of 
public officials. Among the various items that make up the Protocol are some articles concerning 
diplomatic functions.  The document suggests that the regularization of jobs abroad, and the 
elimination of job duplications in public administration are presidential priorities. When the 
current president Danilo Medina was a presidential candidate in 2012, he signed the “Protocol for 
Transparency and Institutions.” He promised to eliminate political clientelism and guarantee a 
professional diplomatic corps career; however, the leader failed to remember this once he was in 
office. Instead, the new president Medina acted as the previous presidents, and when he won the 
elections did not make the promised changes. The new representative of the executive power could 
not disarm the historic political patronage that defines the Dominican Foreign Ministry. 
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The document signed by the President in 2012 failed in two important ways. The first 
failure is regarding measurement 7, which highlights the granting of unnecessary jobs that increase 
the national budget (Citizen Participation, 2012) 
Measure 7. “To sponsor the elimination of overlapping job responsibilities across the many organs 
of public administration, by suppressing the excedent institutions and recurring, when necessary, to 
the support of the National Congress for legislative changes required to consolidate bodies that meet 
similar functions or overlapping ones and in this way contribute to the eradication of patronage, a 
pernicious form of corruption" (Citizen Participation, 2014, 15). 
 
Likewise, Measure 7 stresses clearly that the executive needs to eliminate corruption and 
patronage in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The new President chose to continue exchanging 
positions for political commitments. 
Another priority that the executive promised in the Protocol was to select a professional 
diplomatic corps. Measurement 9 requires that the regularization of jobs abroad have to be a 
priority for the executive. (Protocol for Transparency and Institutions, 2012). 
Measure 9. Ensure, in the same way, that the Foreign Service of the Dominican Republic will 
journey in the way of the professionalization of the diplomatic and consular functions. It will 
constitute a priority to support the diplomatic career and the rationalization of the designation 
outside” (Citizen Participation, 2014, 15). 
 
According to Participación Ciudadana (Citizen Participation) the Government has not 
fulfilled these measures. The year 2013 was the first year of monitoring the measures and it was 
found that 63% of the time the measures were broken, and 27% of the time they were in the 
process of being broken. On the other hand, the second assessment shows a setback in the 
implementation of the measures, as 77% have not been fulfilled, and only 22% are in the process 
of being fulfilled. The first survey reflected that just one measure was accomplished; however, in 
the second monitoring none of the measurements were fulfilled completely (Citizen 
Participation, 2014) 
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Professionalism, Accountability and a New Public Diplomacy  
The organization Participación Ciudadana, or “Civil Participation,” emphasizes that in the 
country, there is a lack of professionalism in the structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Likewise, the organization claims that the Ministry has been characterized by political favoritism 
and patronage. In the analysis, the NGO points out that the Dominican Republic will never have a 
professional foreign service if the government does not dismantle the culture of exchange votes 
for favors (Pimentel, 2014). 
According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, payrolls in 2013-2014, ministers and 
politicians recommended some of the appointed diplomats. These officials had obtained the 
positions for past political favors (Acento.com.do, 2014).The consular payroll from 2013-2014 
does not present a picture of professionalism in diplomacy. On the contrary, the payroll highlights 
that 26% of the officials were recommended by ex-presidents, senators, and deputies from the 
current political party (PLD).  
In addition, 32% of the diplomats were from the Reformist Political Party (PRSC). This 
shows the effects of the strategic alliance between PRSC and PLD. And 30% of the employees 
were still recommended by the Senator Felix Bautista. Likewise, 5.93% of the officials are 
receiving their money from other government offices, or they do not have a listed salary because 
they have not actually occupied the position (Acento.com.do, 2014). 
 Accountability in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is a necessity that can only be realized 
with the pressure of the citizens. Ali Farazmand points out that accountability is possible when 
public institutions have elements of control and professionalism, because a qualified professional 
is concerned with social needs. The author highlights that, “professionalization introduces task 
performance, efficiency, effectiveness, objectivity, integrity, identity, and cohesion” (Farazmand, 
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1997, p. 309).  The weakness in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been a lack of professionalism; 
however, the efforts to make the institution more professional clash with the actions of the political 
authorities.  
The Dominican Republic is not the only country in Latin America to confront this problem. 
Mexico also has difficulties. The diplomat Enrique Hubbard Urrea stresses that career diplomats 
confront a lot of bureaucracy in order to receive a position in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
Mexico. A professional has to fill out an application, which is then analyzed by an official, 
followed by the Foreign Minister. However, those who have political connections do not fill out 
an application at all (Urrea, 2012). 
Accountability seems to be a hard political commitment to achieve. Farazman suggests 
different approaches to developing accountability in order to obtain a more credible public service 
corps. He points to various approaches of “managerial-organizational,” where the institutions 
need to be well organized with clear definitions of the functions of each position. In this type of 
approach, every official has to understand the responsibilities of everyone and follow the 
organizational system (Farazmand, 1997). 
 The second approach he introduces is called “political means,” which highlights the 
legislative oversight, budgetary control, and rotation in office to reduce the risk of 
misrepresentation of public interest, amassment of power. Also important are representation and 
public participation, whistleblowing, sunshine laws, and an effective organizational and 
managerial approach. The third approach that the author advocates is the “legal path,” which helps 
to protect the constitutional rights of every citizen. Likewise, Farazman concludes that the cultural 
approach uses the element of ethics as a valuable form of education through academic, religious 
or secular entities to promote consciousness (Farazmand, 1997, p. 303). However, these forms of 
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accountability are difficult to apply when a country does not implement the laws and has higher 
levels of patronage and corruption that are deeply rooted in political culture. 
On the other hand, some academics call attention to the Foreign Ministries around the 
world and explain that only a small group trains their personal candidates to be players in the 
transnational network. However, the new structure of diplomacy is not to serve as a cultural agent. 
An agent of diplomacy should not focus solely on signing economic contracts as the Dominican 
Republic has been doing. As stated by Melissen, the role of diplomacy  
 
… is not only ‘art’ and ‘culture, but also communicating a country’s thinking, research, journalism 
and national debate. In this perspective, the traditional areas of cultural exchange become part of a 
new type of international communication and the growth of public diplomacy becomes a reaction 
to the close connection between cultural, press and information activities as a result of new social, 
economic and political realities (Melissen, 2005). 
 
Experts in international relations suggest that the new form of diplomacy need not only have an 
integration between the civil societies in other countries, but that the embassies should contain 
experts in foreign relations that go beyond political patronage, as well.  
Diplomacy has changed over the years and it is important that a country formulates national 
politics, communicates ideas, and listen the foreign publics to control these changes. Before a 
Foreign Ministry can begin a training process, it needs to address issues of corruption and 
patronage within the organization. In that sense, the use of diplomacy for personal purposes in 
some countries has been criticized by many academics.  
 
Conclusion 
I explained in this chapter how patronage, corruption and the gap between laws and reality 
affect the Dominican Republic’s foreign policy. I also point out that in order to develop a New 
Public Diplomacy, the Dominican Republic needs to listen to foreign publics. By examining of the 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the country, I highlighted the characteristics of patronage between 
the current government and political parties. I evaluated the history of patronage in the institution 
and how these elements disturb the relationship between the Dominican Republic and external 
publics. Another complication is the corruption in the Payrolls of the Ministry in 2013 and 2015, 
where a diplomat in the U.S earned more money than the U.S. president. I also presented some 
statistics that placed the Dominican Republic as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. 
I also evaluated how these public officials are breaking the laws of the country with 
impunity. Even though these laws stressed that there needs to be a “limited and necessary" group 
of people in the diplomatic corps, media and public opinion show that the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs is an institution full of ‘empty bottles,’ and the country has more people in the diplomatic 
corps than other countries which have much larger populations such as Mexico, Argentina and 
Brazil. Diplomats break the laws without e regulation or accountability. 
I also evaluated some legal documents such as the Dominican Constitution, the Organic 
Law of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Protocol of Transparency and Institution. I 
evaluated that there are some problems in the enforcement of the 314 Organic Law of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. First, I discovered that the Ministry has been governed by an obsolete law since 
1964, and even though some political elites proposed a new one in 2011, the Chamber of Senators 
has yet to approve it. This implies a delay in the creation of a new framework for public diplomacy 
in the Dominican Republic. However, it is not only a diplomatic stock with other countries in the 
field of trade and cultural exchange, but also an institutional stagnation, which has not allowed the 
Dominican Republic to handle diplomacy professionally. Likewise, the institution has many 
diplomats who are not exercising their jobs abroad. This implies that the country has high levels 
of corruption and political clientelism.  
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The old Law 314 specifies sanctions for diplomats who are not exercising their jobs; 
however, the new law created in 2011 puts the emphasis on dismissal of any diplomats who are 
violating this law. Making a comparative analysis between the two laws, I found that the new one 
does not offer much guidance on how the law is going to sanction those in violation. However, the 
new law has some improvements in terms of regulations to evaluate the role of diplomats overseas 
like the Diplomatic and Consular Council, even though, it is not clear who the actors are that are 
going to be involved in the Council. Despite the fact that the Ministry has experienced small 
improvements, it continues to face widespread corruption and political clientelism. 
I also evaluated the Dominican Constitution, specifically Article 146, and the Dominican 
Republic Protocol of Transparency and Institutions (Johnson and Reynolds, 2008). In these 
documents it can be seen that the Dominican Republic has clear positions about the importance of 
transparency in institutions, and the law condemns any act of corruption. However, I also presented 
evidence to illustrate how the government violates the law as do the citizens. 
I argue that one of the main reasons for this gap between law and reality is rooted in the 
time of the former president, Joaquín Balaguer. Balaguer actually claimed that the constitution was 
“just a piece of paper”. Despite the many problems with his regime, the majority of the Dominicans 
saw his 22 years in power as the standard way of doing democracy in the Dominican Republic. 
The legacy of Balaguer’s ideologies framed how Dominicans perceive the law. The common 
attitude about breaking laws is not only evident in the state, but also in different levels of the 
society, where citizens also violate laws with impunity. Nevertheless, I state the importance of 
citizen participation to be more active in disarming patronage, corruption and the breaking of laws. 
In order to acquire a new concept of public diplomacy, the Dominican government and its citizens 
must leave behind the nationalist discourse and listen to international public opinion.   
  57 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
The Role of Government, Citizens and International Publics 
 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis explains that Dominican diplomacy faces internal challenges in developing a 
new framework for foreign affairs. This thesis demonstrates that soft power has not been achieved 
by the Dominican government, in spite of the fact that the country has cultural programs around 
the world. Soft power and the new concept of public diplomacy can only be achieved by an 
integrated strategy that includes: the government, local citizens and international public opinion. 
This research explains the reasons behind the Dominican Republic’s failing diplomacy. I 
defined three problems in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that reinforce this inheritance: patronage, 
corruption and legal idealism. I described how the weakness of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
leads to disrepute. In my interview with Mu Kien Sang, she described the complications in 
Dominican diplomacy. Likewise, other academics have denounced corruption and political 
clientelism in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. International and domestic public opinion not only 
reveals the institutional weakness of the Ministry, but also provided an internal discussion in 
academia about the current state of Dominican diplomacy. 
Furthermore, I evaluated different variables such as patronage, corruption and legal 
idealism in several important documents pertaining to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Patronage 
is demonstrated through the exploration of the alliance formed by the Reformist Political Party 
and the Liberation party, which led the first to take control of the Ministry. According to the 
document, “Political Culture of Democracy in the Dominican Republic, 2014” conducted by the 
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United States Agency for International Development, the Latin American Public Opinion 
(LAPOP), and Americas Barometer, 37.1% of Dominicans expressed that they received a 
patronage offer during campaign elections. The D.R. has higher levels of political clientelism than 
Mexico, Argentina and Venezuela.  
The 2013 Ministry payroll highlights that political clientelism and corruption are part of 
how the government is conducting diplomacy. Next to each official name on the 2013 payroll there 
is also a description of who that person is and by whom they were recommended. The documents 
highlight a large number of people from the Reformist Party and a large group of people personally 
recommended by Senator Felix Bautista, who is accused of high levels of corruption by 
Transparency International (Transparency International, 2016). Another case of corruption is the 
Ambassador to Spain, Cesar Medina, who earned $ 40,000 USD per month, more than the base 
salary of the United States president. The 2015 payrolls published by the Dominican Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs still contain many irregularities, even though the government reduced the salaries 
drastically (MIREX, 2015). Additionally, the Dominican Republic has more permanent officials 
in the Blue Book of United Nations than any other nation in the region. A survey by USAID in 
2008 found a gap between corruption in institutions and victims of corruption in the country. Only 
16.3 % of the people in the survey reported they were victims of corruption, in contrast to the 45.9 
% who declared corruption in the state. The survey implies that many people who are guilty of 
bribery do not categorize themselves as corrupt (Morgan, et al., 2010).   
 The third variable that I tested is the theory of law and reality. To do this, I assessed three 
main documents. The documents are the Dominican Constitution specifically article 149; the 
Organic Law of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is from 1964; and the Dominican Republic 
Protocol of Transparency and Institutions. Article 149 condemns any type of corruption by state 
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officials; however, impunity remains the norm in the Dominican state.  In these documents, it can 
be seen that the Dominican Republic has clear legal positions about the importance of transparency 
and condemns any act of corruption. The Protocol of Transparency highlights that measurements 
7 and 9, which concern the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a diplomatic career, are not fully 
completed by the president. This confirms that there is a difference between the reality that the 
country is experiencing and the legal requirements. 
Policy Implications 
This study reflects how the weakness in the Dominican Ministry of Foreign Affairs implies 
concrete problems for the exercise of diplomacy as well as for democracy. The lack of compliance 
with the laws, the shortcomings of the executive and the unwillingness of civil society to demand 
accountability from the government in the face of patronage, corruption and the absence of rule of 
law have provoked a diplomatic calamity. The Ministry has been ruled a patronage system with 
an obsolete law. The Organic Law of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was created from 1964, 
during the Trujillo dictatorship. The Dominican government never changed its foreign policy even 
though the country has undergone a democratic transition. Only an active citizen movement can 
provoke changes. 
 Even though the Dominican state has made some changes in 2015, the data that I present 
can be used for further policy changes. Furthermore, my study indicates that citizen participation 
is vital for change to happen. Jurgen Habermas (1996) argues that in order to solve the problem of 
rule of law in modern societies, states need social integration to have a better application of 
democracy. Habermas explains that modern law framed subjective laws that do not consider the 
demands of the society. Moreover, Habermas proposed a discursive theory to alleviate the existing 
problems between facts and norms. Habermas stresses the important role of public discourse in 
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democratic institutions (Habermas, 1996). However, in order to have citizen participation, 
individuals need to know the difference between rights and duties. 
In the case of Dominican Republic, social integration has shown some improvements in 
the past years; however, there is still a long way to go to achieve citizen participation. Even though 
there are many social movements who protest against the system, I identify two problems in 
Dominican society. The first obstacle is the pessimistic social atmosphere where citizens do not 
want to be involved in political and social change because they consider protesting to be an 
ineffective way to influence corrupt politicians. Carmen Beatriz Ruíz (2007) points out that 
countries lose legitimacy when citizens lose confidence in the lawmakers. Ruíz stresses that there 
is a “... huge gap between discourse and practice; the imbalance between rights and duties; the 
authoritarian practice of viewing civic processes as homogenizing initiatives” (Tulchin & 
Ruthenberg, 2007, p. 213). Ruíz suggests that to recover laws and institutions, countries must 
develop social networks to integrate different sectors of the society to control and monitor public 
institutions (Tulchin & Ruthenberg, 2007). 
Countries that achieve an integration between the state, citizens and international 
constituencies could achieve successful soft power. These kinds of regimes change the traditional 
paradigms of diplomacy. The international accusations triggered a nationalist discourse between 
citizens. Rather than leveraging this opportunity, the Dominican government used this discourse 
to distract attention away from the weaknesses of the state. If the country does not change its policy 
towards diplomacy and continues maintaining the system of patronage, corruption, and elite 
control, the diplomatic image of the country will not improve. 
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Possible Future Research 
The Dominican Republic has not been studied much in terms of foreign affairs. The 
Dominican Republic has strong foreign relations with the United States. G. Pope Atkins and 
Larman Cutis (1998) explain that the U.S relationship with the Dominican Republic involves many 
features including;  
establishing receiverships and forming banking consortia; landing troops and 
organizing militarily occupations; recognizing or refusing new governments; 
granting or refusing to provide foreign assistance (economic, military, and 
technical);supervising elections; supporting dictators; and promoting democracy 
and development (Atkins & Wilson, 1998, p. 1). 
The bilateral relations that these countries have developed over the years are highly debated 
in academia. In this thesis, I hope to transform the discourse of traditional (mostly bi-lateral) 
diplomacy that only involves interventions, economic treaties and cultural exchanges by 
introducing the new concept of public diplomacy and soft power to the analysis of the Dominican 
Republic. Nevertheless, this research measures the relationship between diplomacy and the 
institutions of diplomacy, and there are other topics that could add significantly to this research. 
Race and diplomacy in the Dominican Republic is an important aspect to be analyzed, due 
to the human rights violations and the proximity with Haiti. The document of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs “Arquitectura Diplomática” emphasizes the aspect of race and the creation of 
programs; however, it doesn’t point out how these development programs can be accountable. As 
I point out in this study, accountability and credibility are important to achieving soft power.  
Another area for future research could be how Dominicans can achieve soft power and 
structure new forms of accountability in diplomacy. Venezuela, Colombia and Mexico have been 
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able to achieve a form of cultural impact around the world. Craig Hayden presents evidence about 
how Venezuela promotes soft power through the manipulation of the media with the political 
participation on television and a socialist discourse with a “counter hegemonic” ideology. Hayden 
highlights that Venezuela conceived its foreign policies with the assumptions that a mediated 
communication can impact other countries and awake the vulnerability of international publics. 
 Moreover, these soft power discourses have many implications for the economic relations 
with other countries and private industry. Venezuela has had a strong influence over the Latin 
American region with the provision of oil and the formation of strategic alliances (Hayden, 2012). 
Another example of soft power is how Japan projects itself as a peaceful country and tries to bury 
the historical legacy of World War II. Craig Hayden (2012) analyses the Japanese strategy of soft 
power with the establishment of some programs around the world such as cultural diplomacy, 
international broadcasting services, and development aid and investment. These examples of soft 
power can serve as examples to the Dominican Republic in pursuing its own diplomatic strategies. 
I believe that in the case of Dominican Republic a better form of soft power is not best 
pursued through these kinds of cultural activities or broadcasting services, but rather I think the 
nation should focus on two points: institutional credibility and human rights.  However, as I 
pointed out earlier, these goals are dependent on a strong integration between the Dominican 
government, citizens and international publics.   
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Appendix B:  Official List of the identified Diplomats in the Dominican Consulates in 2013. (Acento.com.do, 2014).The author 
of this research only removed the diplomats ID numbers and photos. 
 
          
    DESIGNACIONES POR DECRETO     
  
  CONSULADO     
  
NOMBRES  RANGO 
DOTACIO
N 
DECRETO 
  
        
  
ALAMEDA - SAN FRANCISCO 
CALIFORNIA , EE.UU.       
1 CELESTE FRANCISCA JIMENEZ CONSUL  23,000.00  DECRET. NO. 631-08 DEL 13-10-08/ HERMANA RADHAMES JIMENEZ 
  
AMSTERDAM- HOLLANDA-REINO DE 
LOS PAISES BAJOS       
2 EDUARDO HERNANDEZ PEREZ VICECONSUL 4,800.00 DECRET. NO.1317-04/ PRESIDENTE DEL PLD EN HOLANDA 
3 CHRISTOPHER LUIS HIDALGO JIMENEZ AUXILIAR 1,800.00 DECRET. NO 559-07/ HIJO BERTHA JIMENEZ-PINA RORIBIO 
  ARUBA       
4 JOSELYNE ROSARIO ROMERO CONSUL GENERAL 16,190.00  DECRET. NO. 526-08 DEL 10/09/08 /  ESPOSA RAFAEL NUNEZ 
5 LEONY ESMERALDA CROES VICECONSUL 5,000.00 
DECRET. NO. 196-11 DEL 24-03-11 / DANILO PEREZ-LEONEL 
FERNANDEZ 
  ANTIGUA Y BARBUDAS       
6 NELSON MELITON  PIMENTEL VICECONSUL 7,000.00 
 DECRET. NO.6-09 DEL 07-01-09/ADRIANO HERRERA/ COMISION PLD-
NEW YORK 
  BARCELONA- ESPAÑA       
7 JOSE TOMAS PEREZ GAUTREAUX VICECONSUL 4,300.00 
DECRET. NO. 533-07/ HIJO DE TAINA GAUTREAUX Y DE JOSE TOMAS 
PEREZ 
8 VICENTE ALFONSO BENGOA ARAGUIZ AUXILIAR 6,300.00 DECRET NO. 113-09/ HIJO DE VICENTE BENGOA 
  72 
9 GRACE BIDO CAMILO AUXILIAR 3,100.00 
DECRET NO. 604-08 DEL 30-09-08/ HIJA DRA. CAMILO/ MARGARITA 
CEDEÑO 
10 DEYMI MERCEDES ABREU CAMPUSANO AUXLIAR  2,100.00  DECRET. NO. 135-12 DEL 22-03-12 / GENERAL CAMPUSANO/ PALACIO 
  
BOSTON, MASSACHUSSETS,-ESTADOS 
UNIDOS       
11 LUDOVINO HERRERA CABRAL VICECONSUL 3,975.00 DECRET. NO.220-06/ ALEJANDRO HERRERA 
12 FRANKIE ALEXANDER FRIAS MOLINA VICECONSUL 5,800.00 DECRET. NO. 188-12 DEL 17-04-12/ CONSULTORIA JURIDICA 
13 XIOMARA ROCHET BRITO VICECONSUL  6,850.00 DECRET. NO. 591-10/ EX -ASISTENTE JURIDICO PALACIO 
14 YESSICA ALEJANDRINA SOSA GERMAN AUXILIAR 4,000.00 
DECRET. NO.1393-04/HIJA DEL EMBAJADOR JOSE SOSA- 
ALEJANDRINA GERMAN 
  BOGOTA- COLOMBIA       
15 JUAN CARLOS MARTINEZ FERNANDEZ VICECONSUL 5,550.00 
DECRET. NO. 664-08 DEL 21-10-08. / HIJO DEL CONSUL Y PRIMO 
PTE.LEONEL FERNANDEZ 
  CARACAS-VENEZUELA       
16 LUIS ALBERTO GUERRA VICECONSUL 3,975.00 DECRET. NO. 456-11 DEL 03-08-11/MARIA KASSE 
  CURAZAO- ANTILLA HOLANDESAS       
17 CARMEN VIRGINIA CARDONA CONSUL GENERAL 10,300.00  DECRET. NO. 413-08 DEL 29/08/08/ HIJA DE DOÑA LIGIA MELO 
18 
EVELYN ALTAGRACIA PERALTA 
LIRIANO VICECONSUL 5,100.00 DECRET. NO. 135-12 DEL 22-03-12 /DAMARIS-DON ABEL 
19 DARIA LISA BENGOA SORIANO VICECONSUL 7,300.00 DECRET. NO.386-10 DEL 29-07-10/ VICENTE BENGOA 
  CHICAGO-ILIINOIS, ESTADOS UNIDOS       
20 LETTY PATRICIA RIVERA TORRES VICECONSUL 4,800.00  DECRET. NO. 520-08 DEL 10-09-08/ HIJA SR. RIVERA- INDUVECA 
  FRANKFURT-ALEMANIA       
21 CESAR FERNANDO JIMENEZ CORDOVA VICECONSUL EN FRANKFURT 3,975.00 
 DECRET. NO.137-12 DEL 22-03-12/ HIJO DEL CONSUL CESAR 
ANTONIO JIMENEZ 
  GENOVA-ITALIA       
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22 INGRID MARIENA ABUD REYNOSO VICECONSUL 3,975.00 
DECRET. NO. 301-11 DEL 12-05-11/ HIJA DE LA EX- EMBAJADORA ANA 
SILVIA REYNOSO 
  
GUADALUPE, DEPARTAMENTO 
FRANCES DE ULTRAMAR       
23 
ANDREA ALTAGRACIA MEDINA 
RODRIGUEZ CONSUL GENERAL 16,300.00 DECRET. NO. 346-11 DEL 02-06-11/ PRIMA PTE. DANILO MEDINA 
24 ANGELA  ROSA ROSADO ARIAS VICECONSUL 3,975.00 DECRET. NO. 346-11 DEL 02-06-11/  CONSUL ANDREA MEDINA 
25 
JAVIER AUGUSTO CUEVAS 
FONTANILLA AUXILIAR 2,100.00 
DECRET. NO. 261-12 DEL 22-05-12/ ESCOLTA CAMPAÑA DE PTE. 
DANILO MEDINA 
  HAMBURGO- ALEMANIA       
26 JULIO CESAR GARABOT AUXILIAR 4,100.00 DECRET NO. 675-10/ EURI CABRAL-PERIODISTA 
  JAMAICA, KINGSTON       
27 FRANCISCO RAFAEL SANTANA POLO VICECONSUL 5,300.00 DECRET NO. 160-11/ FELIX VASQUEZ- SENADOR 
28 CAROLINA E. LUGO FERNANDEZ VICECONSUL 5,300.00 
 DECRET. NO. 409-11 DEL 04-07-11/ SOBRINA PTE. LEONEL 
FERNANDEZ 
  JUANA MENDEZ- HAITI       
29 RAFAEL TOMAS CALDERON MAUSIAN VICECONSUL 4,800.00  DECRET. NO. 698-08 DEL 27-10-08,  CONSUL EUNICE JIMENO 
30 RAMON LEONEL PEREZ SANCHEZ VICECONSUL 5,975.00 DECRET NO. 580-05/ HIJO DE JUANA SANCHEZ 
31 MARLENNE ELAINE MORA DE NUÑEZ VICECONSUL 5,300.00 DECRET. NO.724-11 DEL 26-11-11/ DON ABEL 
  MADRID-ESPAÑA       
32 ANA ROCIO ESCOTO HERNANDEZ VICEONSUL 6,000.00 DECRET. NO. 620-11 DEL 14-10-11/ HIJA DE MAYOBANEX 
33 MILDRY YOCASTA FELIZ 
VICECONSUL PARA IMPLEMENTACION DEL 
SISTEMA D GESTION CONSULAR 5,800.00  DECRET. NO.115-11 DEL 3-03-11 / MARCOS CROSS 
34 OLMEDO DE JESUS PINEDA FELIZ AUXILIAR, ENC. DEL DEPARTAMENTO DE PRENSA 3,100.00 DECRET. NO. 334-09 DEL 28/04/2009/ MELTON PINEDA 
35 FILDA BONETTI AUXILIAR 4,600.00 DECRET. NO. 223-11 DEL 13-04-11/ LUIS MANUEL BONETTI 
36 IGNACIO A. BENGOA ARAGUIS AUXILIAR 4,220.00 DECRET. NO. 496-05/ HIJO DE VICENTE BENGOA 
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37 ABRIL MORA GARCIA AUXILIAR 4,370.00 
DECRET. NO. 284-07/ HIJA DE JORGE SEVERINO (MINISTRO 
PRESIDENCIA) 
  ISLAS CANARIAS- ESPAÑA       
38 CLEMENTE SANTOS MERCEDES VICECONSUL EN ISLAS CANARIAS 4,300.00 DECRET. NO.617-10 DEL 06-11-10/ MARCOS CROSS 
39 MARIA IVELISSE ALONZO LA PAZ AUXILIAR EN ISLAS CANARIAS 2,300.00 DECRET. NO.617-10 DEL 06-11-10/ MARCOS CROSS 
  MARSELLA - FRANCIA       
40 
GLORIA ALTAGRACIA PEGUERO 
MENDEZ VICECONSUL 5,300.00 DECRET. NO. 455-07/ HERMANA HECTOR PEGUERO MENDEZ 
41 MIGUELINA RIVERA VICECONSUL 3,975.00  DECRET. NO. 45-11 DEL 08-02-11/ LAURA FAXAS 
  MILAN-ITALIA       
42 TEODORO APONTE DISLA VICECONSUL 6,000.00 
DECRET NO. 658-05/ ESPOSO MERCEDES BRITO/ CONSUL DE 
GENOVA 
43 CARLING MANUEL PUIG HERNANDEZ AUXILIAR 4,300.00 
 DECRET. NO. 223-11 DEL 13-04-11/ HERMANO GERENAL PUIG 
(AVANZADA) 
  
MAYAGUEZ- PUERTO RICO  ESTADOS 
UNIDOS       
44 JOSE STEFAN BOSCH CONSUL 15,300.00 DECRET. NO. 779-09 DEL 21-10-09/ NIETO DE JUAN BOSCH 
45 INDIANA ISABEL JIMENEZ BOSCH VICECONSUL 5,300.00 DECRET NO. 1386-04/ NIETA DE JUAN BOSCH 
46 LUISA ELENA RAMIREZ SANTANA VICECONSUL 6,300.00 DECRET NO. 375-09/ RAFAEL ALBURQUERQUE 
47 LISSELOTTE FERNANDEZ BAEZ VICECONSUL 7,800.00 DECRET NO. 266-10/ SOBRINA PTE. LEONEL FERNANDEZ 
  MONTREAL - CANADA       
48 LUISA VIOLETA SANTANA JIMENEZ VICECONSUL EN MONTREAL 7,500.00 DECRET. NO.97-10 DEL 03-08-10 / LUIS MANUEL BONETTI 
49 FRANK CARLOS CABRAL GARCIA VICECONSUL 4,300.00 DECRET. NO. 727-08 DEL 29-10-08 HIJO FRANK CABRAL 
50 ANGELIN ESPERANZA MINIER AUXILIAR 4,800.00 
 DECRET. NO. 6-09 DEL 07-01-09/ ESPOSA PAULINO- CHOFER PTE. 
FERNANDEZ/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK 
51 CYNTHIA MARIE RODRIGUEZ BUSTO AUXILIAR 3,320.00 DECRET. NO. 322-07/ HIJA ASISTENTE FRANCISCO JAVIER 
  75 
  
MIAMI, FLORIDA, ESTADOS UNIDOS 
DE AMERICA       
52 JANET LEE BLANDINO CASTILLO VICECONSUL 9,800.00 
DECRET. NO. 754-08 DEL 17-11-08/ ESPOSA PROCURADOR  RADHAMES 
JIMENEZ 
53 MARIA ERNESTINA PEÑA SURIEL VICECONSUL 5,900.00 DECRET. NO. 69-09/ LUIS MANUEL BONETTI 
54 MARIA ROSA ZELLER BARROUS AUXILIAR/HONORIFICA   DECRET. NO. 220-08/ LUIS MANUEL BONETTI 
55 
ELIZABETH DEL C. DE JESUS LORA 
LITHGOW AUXILIAR 2,100.00 DECRET. NO.223-11/ DON ABEL 
56 BELKIS BLANDINO AUXILIAR  2,100.00 
 DECRET. NO. 762-08 DEL 24-11-08 /PROCURADOR RADHAMES 
JIMENEZ 
57 LUIS MANUEL HERRERA AUXILIAR 5,420.00 DECRET. NO. 486-06/ ADRIANO HERRERA 
  NEW ORLEANS--ESTADOS UNIDOS       
58 LISSETTE JOSEFINA MARTINEZ MUÑIZ VICECONSUL 8,850.00  DECRET. NO. 113-09 DEL 14-02-09/ ESPOSA JOEL LANTIGUA 
59 
FEDERICO AUGUSTO ANTUN 
HERNANDEZ VICECONSUL 7,300.00 DECRET. NO 256-11 DEL 25-04-11/ HIJO QUIQUE ANTUN 
60 ELOISA SOSA CAMPUSANO VICECONSUL 4,900.00 DECRET. NO. 222-11 DEL 13-04-11/ ALEJANDRO HERRERA/DON ABEL 
  NEW  YORK--ESTADOS UNIDOS       
61 LUIS FERNANDO RODRIGUEZ SANTOS AUXILIAR  4,100.00 DECRET. NO. 675-10 DEL 01-12-10 / EURI CABRAL 
62 NORMA ROSA CAMPUSANO AUXILIAR 4,500.00 DECRET. NO. 134-110 DEL 08-03-11/ GRAL. CAMPUSANO (PALACIO) 
63 CARMEN OLGA CASTILLO BURGOS AUXILIAR 2,100.00 
 DECRET. NO. 760-08 DEL 24-11-08/HERMANA OSCAR CASTILLO/ 
ASIST. PTE. FERNANDEZ 
  MEXICO D.F 
    
  
64 
ARIADNA DEL CARMEN VASQUEZ 
GERMAN 
VICECONSUL 
5,900.00 DECRET. NO. 500-05/ ALEJANDRINA GERMAN 
  REPUBLICA CHECA--RUSIA       
65 REYNA CAMACHO DE COHEN VICECONSUL 5,300.00 DECRET. NO. 174-11 DEL 18-03-11/ MADRE DE MICHEL COHEN 
  RIO DE JANEIRO--BRASIL       
  76 
66 ENRIQUILLO CLIME RIVERA VICECONSUL 6,100.00 
 DECRET. NO. 532-09 DEL 24-07-09/ HIJO EMBAJADOR END. ASUNTOS 
DEL CARIBE 
  PANAMA--PANAMA       
67 LLUDMILA DESIREE PUJOLS VICECONSUL 5,000.00 
 DECRET. NO. 34-09 DEL 17-01-09/ ESPOSA ALBERTO PEÑA *EX 
SECRETARIA TEMO. 
68 CAMILO BERMUDEZ VICECONSUL 7,500.00 
TRASLAD. ADMSMIAMI. OFIC. NO.8907  DEL 17-09-09 HERMANO 
MICALO BERMUDEZ 
69 YASMIN MATOS ACOSTA VICECONSUL 7,800.00 DECRET. NO.637-10 DEL 15-11-10/ VICTOR SANCHEZ 
70 CARMEN MILADY SANCHEZ ROSARIO AUXILIAR 5,200.00 DECRET.NO.785-09 DEL 26-10-09 / HERMANA VICTOR SANCHEZ 
71 JESUS ANDRES SOLIS NOVAS AUXILIAR 5,100.00 DECRET. NO. 223-11 DEL 13-04-11/ VICTOR SANCHEZ 
  PUERTO PRINCIPE - HAITI       
72 NILDO CESAR DE  LOS SANTOS SOLIS VICECONSUL 6,000.00 
 DECRET. NO. 176-11 DEL 18-03-11/ EX-DIR. COM. ZONAS 
FRONTERIZAS/ AGREGADO 
  
SAN JUAN- PUERTO RICO--ESTADOS 
UNIDOS       
73 MILEDYS MIOSOTIS ARIAS VICECONSUL 7,200.00 
CAMBIO DESIGNACION DECRET. NO.501-10 DEL 31-08-10/ MIGUEL 
MEJIA 
74 DEBRESKA DE LEON SANTIAGO AUXILIAR CONSULAR 2,100.00 DECRE. NO. 617-11 EL 14-10-11 / DAMARIS/ DON ABEL 
75 MARISEL LISTER VILLAVIZAR AUXILIAR CONSULAR 5,716.00  DECRET. NO. 724-08 DEL 29-10-08/ OCTAVIO LISTER- EMB. PANAMA 
  SAO PAULO- BRASIL       
76 ALCIBIADES GEOMAR GARCIA ROJAS CONSUL 16,300.00 DECRET. NO,.675-10 DEL 1-12-10/ PERIODISTA 
77 
FRANCIA CONCEPCION MARTINEZ 
DRULLARD VICECONSUL 7,600.00 DECRET. NO. 71-05/ ALEJANDRO HERRERA 
78 RUTH SILVANA HERRERA PLACENCIA AUXILIAR 3,420.00 / ALEJANDRO HERRERA 
  
SAN  MARTEEN--ANTILLAS 
HOLANDESA       
79 RAMONA AURORA MARTI MACEO VICECONSUL 3,975.00  DECRET. NO.254-11 DEL 25-04-11 / ARISTIPO VIDAL 
80 FLAVIA VIRGINIA ROJO VIDAL VICECONSUL 3,975.00 DECRET. NO.254-11 DEL 25-04-11/ ARISTIPO VIDAL 
  77 
  SEVILLA- ESPAÑA       
81  ALEJANDRA GUTIERREZ DIAZ CONSUL GENERAL 14,000.00 DECRET NO. 54-08 DEL 18-09-08/ HIJA EUCLIDES GUTIERREZ 
82 ELIAS AHMED SERULLE AYBAR AUXILIAR 4,800.00 DECRET. NO.499-11 DEL 19-08-11/ HIJO ELIAS SERRULLE 
  VALENCIA - ESPAÑA       
83 
DANILDA EVELYN DE LOS SANTOS 
RODRIGUEZ VICECONSUL 5,300.00 DECRET. NO. 134-11 DEL 08-03-11/ HERMANA NILDO DE LOS SANTOS 
84 LEONOR DE LA CRUZ AUXILIAR 2,100.00 DECRET. NO. 181-09 DEL 10-03-09/ F. GARCIA VALENTIN 
  ZURICH - SUIZA       
85 CRUGELL MARIANO ZORRILLA VICECONSUL 5,100.00 DECRET. NO. 514-08 DEL 10-09-08 / PRIMO DE CRISPIN 
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Appendix C:. Senator Felix Bautista. Unmask the Corrupt (Transparency International, 2016) 
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Appendix D. List of the Dominican Foreign Service (Citizen Participation, 2014). 
 
PAÍS CONSULAD
O 
EMBAJADA TOTAL 
Alemania 1
5 
1
6 
31 
Antigua Barbuda 1
0 
- 10 
Antillas 
Holandesas 
1
4 
- 14 
Argentina - 2
0 
20 
Aruba 1
0 
- 10 
Austria - 1
5 
15 
Bélgica 9 1
4 
23 
Brasil 1
8 
2
5 
43 
Canadá 2
5 
3
4 
59 
Chile - 2
0 
20 
China - 1
2 
12 
Colombia 6 2
6 
32 
Corea - 4 4 
Costa Rica - 2
6 
26 
Cuba 5 2
4 
29 
Curazao 1
0 
- 10 
Ecuador - 1
9 
19 
    
PAÍS CONSULADO EMBAJADA TOTAL 
Egipto - 7 7 
El Salvador - 1
0 
10 
Emiratos Árabes 1 2 3 
España 9
1 
2
8 
119 
Estados Unidos 2
1
4 
3
3 
247 
Francia 1
9 
1
0 
29 
Grecia 6 - 6 
Guatemala - 1
9 
19 
Honduras 1 1
8 
19 
India - 9 9 
Inglaterra - 1
5 
15 
Italia 1
6 
3
3 
49 
Irán - 2 2 
  80 
Israel - 5 5 
Jamaica 11 2
0 
31 
Japón 6 1
0 
16 
Marruecos - 6 6 
México 5 2
1 
26 
Nicaragua - 1
8 
18 
Panamá 2
4 
3
4 
58 
Paraguay - 9 9 
Perú - 1
3 
13 
Portugal - 2
1 
21 
Puerto Rico 4
2 
- 42 
Qatar - 2 2 
República Checa 3 - 3 
República 
Sudáfrica 
- 4 4 
Rusia - 1
2 
12 
Suecia - 6 6 
Suiza 6 6 12 
Trinidad y Tobago - 1
6 
16 
Uruguay - 1
8 
18 
Venezuela 1
0 
2
2 
32 
SUBTOTAL 5
7
7 
684 1261 
FAO  5 5 
Misión Austria  3 3 
OEA  4
3 
43 
Suiza  1 1 
ONU  7
7 
77 
UNESCO  6 6 
SUBTOTAL  1
3
5 
135 
TOTAL 577 8
1
9 
1396 
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Appendix E: Official List of Staff recommended by the Senator Felix Bautista in 2013. (Acento.com.do, 2014). Note: the 
Author of this Research only Removed the Diplomats ID Numbers and Photos. 
 
    
CONSULADOS -
RECOMENDADOS 
POR FELIX 
BAUTISTA   
  NOMBRE RANGO/PAIS OBSERVACION 
1 RAMON EMILIO REYES 
AUXILIAR  EN RIO DE JANEIRO-
BRASIL 
DECRET. NO. 6-9/ COMISION PLD-NEW 
YORK 
2 MELVI TRINIDAD 
AUXILIAR  EN RIO DE JANEIRO-
BRASIL 
Traslasd desde Ny.COMISION PLD-NEW 
YORK 
3 JUAN BAUTISTA ALONZO DE LA CRUZ AUXILIAR EN AMBERES, BELGICA 
DECRET. NO.182-09 DEL 10-03-09/ COMISION 
PLD- NEW YORK 
4 DAMIAN MEDINA AUXILIAR- EN ANTIGUA Y BARBUDA 
 DECRET. NO.4-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-
NEW YORK 
5 JUAN ANTONIO  HERNANDEZ PICHARDO AUXILIAR- EN ANTIGUA Y BARBUDA 
 DECRET. NO.182-09 DEL 10-03-09/ COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
6 RAMON HERIBERTO PICHARDO AUXILIAR EN ATENAS-GRECIA 
 DECRET. NO. 6-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-
NEW YORK 
7 GERALDO DE JESUS GUZMAN AUXILIAR EN ATENAS-GRECIA 
DECRET. NO. 6-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-
NEW YORK 
8 ABIGAIR RODRIGUEZ AUXILIAR EN BELLADERE-HAITI 
DECRET. NO.8-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-
NEW YORK 
9 CARLOS JOSE  ESTEVEZ  SANTELISES AUXILIAR EN BELLADERE-HAITI 
DECRET. NO.8-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-
NEW YORK 
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10 ANA GUILLERMINA NUÑEZ AUXILIAR EN BOSTON 
DECRET. 662-08 DEL 21/10/08/ FELIX 
BAUTISTA 
11 MARTA JULIA DE PEÑA ROBLES AUXILIAR EN CURAZAO 
DECRET NO.182-09 DEL10-03-09/ COMISION PLD-
NEW YORK 
12 TOMAS GUZMAN RAMIREZ 
AUXILIAR- EN HAMBURGO-
ALEMANIA 
 DECRET. NO. 6-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-
NEW YORK 
13 ANGELIN ESPERANZA MINIER AUXILIAR EN MONTREAL-CANADA 
 DECRET. NO. 6-09  ESPOSA PAULINO- 
CHOFER PTE. FERNANDEZ/ COMISION 
PLD-NY 
14 REBECA MEDINA AUXILIAR EN MONTREAL-CANADA COMISION PLD-NEW YORK 
15 RODOLFO FURGENCIO AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK 
DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
16 RAMON ALFONSO RODRIGUEZ AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK 
TRASLADADO ADMS.. 9715 DEL 13-04-10/ 
COMISION PLD-NEW YORK 
17 FELIX MANUEL LEDESMA MELO AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK 
DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
18 RAMON ELADIO FERNANDEZ AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK 
 DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
19 NOEMI MORENO AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK 
 DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
20 OSCAR MEREJO AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK 
DECRET. NO.4-9 COMISION PLD-NEW 
YORK 
21 RAFAEL ANTONIO SANCHEZ VILLANUEVA AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK 
 DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
22 
RICARDO ANTONIO DE JESUS 
BURROUGHS BATISTA AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK 
 DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
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23 JUAN ALEXIS HERNANDEZ SANTANA AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK 
 DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
24 EDWIN ABREU AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK 
 DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
25 APOLINAR RONDON AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK 
 DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
26 
RAFAEL MARCELINO RODRIGUEZ 
MARTINEZ AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK 
DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
27 JUAN ANTONIO ALBA MARTE AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK 
 DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
28 MANUEL SUERO AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK 
DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
29 FRANCISCO A. FERNANDEZ AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK 
 DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
30 ARMANDO MELO AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK 
DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
31 VICTOR RIVERA AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK 
DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
32 AGAPITA PEREZ AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK 
 DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
33 RITA M. ESTRELLA DE CONIL AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK 
DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
34 HECTOR TRONCOSO AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK 
 DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
35 ALFONSO POY AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK 
DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
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36 MARIA DE LOS ANGELES MAÑON AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK 
DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
37 XIOMARA PAYANO AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK 
DECRET. NO. 21-09 DEL 07-01-09 / COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
38 JOSEFINA JIMENEZ AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK 
DECRET. NO. 21-09 DEL 07-01-09 / COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
39 FELIPE FELIZ AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK 
DECRET. NO. 21-09 DEL 07-01-09 / COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
40 FRANCISCO SOLER AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK 
 DECRET. NO. 21-09 DEL 07-01-09 /COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
41 YAZMIR ALTAGRACIA PUJOLS CASTILLO AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK 
.DECRET. NO. 182-09 DEL 10-03-09 / / COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
42 
ANDREA JACQUELINE PERALTA ROJAS DE 
MEJIA AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK 
PROCESO DE PENSION- COMISION 
PLD-NY 
43 FRANCISCA GRISELDA BATISTA AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK 
DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-
NEW YORK 
44 ELIA GARIN RIVERA ALVAREZ AUXILIAR EN SEVILLA- ESPAÑA 
DECRET. NO.3-09 DEL 07-01-09/ FELIX 
BAUTISTA 
45 NELSON COLLADO AUXILIAR EN TOKYO-JAPON 
DECRET. NO.8-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-
NEW YORK 
46 LOURDES FERNANDEZ AUXILIAR-MARSELLA-FRANCIA 
DECRET. NO. 4-09 DEL 07-01-09// COMISION PLD-
NEW YORK 
47 FREDDY B. GARCIA PEÑA CONSUL EN VALENCIA 
DECRET. NO. 495-11  DEL 19-08-11 SUST. A FRANK 
BENCOSME/ FELIX BAUTISTA 
48 IRMA BAUTISTA 
CONSUL GENERAL- ISLAS 
CANARIAS-ESPAÑA 
 DECRET.NO.306-09 DEL 22-04-2009/ HERMANA 
DE FELIX BAUTISTA 
49 
TAMAYO JUAN SALVADOR TEJEDA 
VENTURA VICECONSUL  EN NEW YORK DECRET NO. 4-09/ COMISION PLD-NY 
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50 MARINO DEL ROSARIO GUERRERO 
VICECONSUL EN AMSTERDAM, 
HOLANDA 
DECRET. NO 6-09 / COMISION PLD-NEW 
YORK 
51 RAFAEL DANUBIO GARCIA 
VICECONSUL EN ANSE A PITRE, 
HAITI 
DECRET. NO. 503-10 DEL 31-08-10/ FELIX 
BAUTISTA 
52 NELSON MELITON  PIMENTEL 
VICECONSUL- EN ANTIGUA Y 
BARBUDA 
 DECRET. NO.6-09 DEL 07-01-09/ADRIANO 
HERRERA/ COMISION PLD-NEW 
YORK 
53 GUARIONEX SANCHEZ VICECONSUL EN ARUBA 
DECRET. NO.6-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-
NEW YORK 
54 MILTON GERMAN HERRAND VICECONSUL EN ATENAS-GRECIA 
DECRET. NO.193-09 DEL 10-03-09/ COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
55 HECTOR PILARTE VICECONSUL EN ATENAS-GRECIA 
DECRET. NO. 4-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-
NEW YORK 
56 CAROLINA RODRIGUEZ DIAZ VICECONSUL EN BARCELONA DECRET NO. 662-08/ FELIX BAUTISTA 
57 FRANCISCO TAVERAS GUZMAN VICECONSUL EN BOSTON 
DECRET. NO. 91-07/ TIENE DECRET NO. 4-09 DE 
EMBAJADA/NO HA TOMO P./COMISION 
PLD-NY 
58 DOMINGA BERIGUETE VICECONSUL- EN CABO HAITIANO 
DECRET. NO.99-09 DEL 09-02-09/ FELIX 
BAUTISTA 
59 YORFI CRISTOBAL BENCOSME GRULLON VICECONSUL- EN CABO HAITIANO DECRET. NO.458 DEL 19-08-10 FELIX BAUTISTA 
60 JOSE MANUEL OVALLES MEJIA VICECONSUL EN COLOMBIA 
DECRET. NO. 259-11 DEL 25-04-11/ FELIX 
BAUTISTA 
61 
 WELLINGTON GERMAN CASANOVA 
CASTILLO VICECONSUL EN CURAZAO 
DECRETO NO.182-09 DEL 10-03-09/ COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
62 HECTOR HIDALGO 
VICECONSUL EN FRANKFURT- 
ALEMANIA 
DECRET. NO. 08-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
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63 CARLOS EUSEBIO MERCEDES 
VICECONSUL EN FRANKFURT- 
ALEMANIA 
 DECRET. NO. 06-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
64 JORGE ANT.GARCIA PAREDES 
VICECONSUL EN FRANKFURT- 
ALEMANIA 
DECRET. NO.182-09 DEL10-03-09/ COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
65 SALVADOR A. PEREZ 
VICECONSUL- EN HAMBURGO-
ALEMANIA 
DECRET. NO. 6-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-
NEW YORK 
66 VANTROI ILIENOV PEÑA 
VICECONSUL EN ISLAS CANARIAS- 
ESPAÑA 
 DECRETO NO. 306-09 DEL 22-04-09/ SOBRINO DE 
FELIX BAUTISTA 
67 SALVADOR ORTIZ VICECONSUL EN JAMAICA 
 DECRET. NO.6-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-
NEW YORK 
68 ROBERTO MORENO VICECONSUL EN MADRID-ESPAÑA 
DECRET. NO. 707-08 DEL 29-10-08 / FELIX 
BAUTISTA 
69 HECTOR LOPEZ VICECONSUL EN MEXICO 
DECRET. NO.6-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-
NEW YORK 
70 RAMONA DELEIDY FELIZ FILPO VICECONSUL EN MIAMI DECRET. 662-08 DEL 21/10/08/ FELIX BAUTISTA 
71 GERMAN DE LEON RODRIGUEZ VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK 
DECRET.1249-04, TIENE  DECRET NO. 4-09 
DE. EMBAJADA /NO TOMO P. 
COMISION PLD-NY 
72 PABLO GARCIA TEJADA VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK 
DECRET. 1382-04, TIENE  DECRET NO. 4-09 
DE. EMBAJADA /NO TOMO P. . 
COMISION PLD-NY 
73 DIONICIO VENTURA VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK 
DECRET. NO.23-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-
NEW YORK 
74 ERNESTO GONZALEZ VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK 
DECRET. NO.23-09  DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
75 CECILIA SANTANA DE BAEZ VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK 
 DECRET. NO.23-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
  87 
76 DAVID CORDERO VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK 
DECRET. NO. 23-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
77 VICTOR ACOSTA HIDALGO VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK 
DECRET. NO. 23-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
78 VICTOR COMPRES VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK 
 DECRET. NO.23-09 DEL 07-01-09 / / COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
79 FRANCISCO ROBLES VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK 
DECRET. 23-09 DEL 07-01-09 / COMISION PLD-
NEW YORK 
80 HILARIO TAVERAS VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK 
DECRET. 23-09 DEL 07-01-09 / COMISION PLD-
NEW YORK 
81 JOSE FRANCISCO JIMENEZ REYES VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK 
DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09 / COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
82 BALTASAR FIGUEREO SIERRA VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK 
DECRET. NO. 23-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
83 JOSE SANTANA VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK 
DECRET. NO. 23-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
84 GREGORIO MALENA VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK 
DECRET. NO.23-09  DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
85 
GEOVANNY AUGUSTO RODRIGUEZ 
MARTINEZ VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK 
 DECRET. NO. 23-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
86 PEDRO P. ZORRILLA VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK 
DECRET. NO. 23-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
87 CARMEN GERMOSEN FELIPE DE DEAN VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK 
 DECRET. NO.131-09 DEL 19-02-09/ COMISION 
PLD-NEW YORK 
88 SANDY JOSE TAVERAS VICECONSUL EN PANAMA 
TRASLADADO ADMS. SAINT. MARTEEN OFIC. NO. 6071 
DEL 04/08/09/ FELIX BAUTISTA 
89 HECTOR MAYOBANEX PEÑA B. VICECONSUL EN PANAMA 
TRASLADADO ADMS. DESDE sUIZA OFIC. NO.20214 DEL 
23-06-10/ FELIX BAUTISTA 
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90 CARLOS GONZALEZ VICECONSUL EN PANAMA 
DECRET. NO. 147-11 DEL 15-03-11/ ESPOSO 
KARINA (FELIX BAUTISTA) 
91 COLOMBINA READ ROA 
VICECONSUL EN PUERTO 
PRINCIPE-HAITI 
DECRET. NO. 537-08 DEL 12-09-08/SUEGRA DE CRISPIN/ 
COMISION PLD-NEW YORK 
92 EMILIANO PEREZ ESPINOSA 
VICECONSUL EN PUERTO 
PRINCIPE-HAITI DECRET. NO. 240-10 / / FELIX BAUTISTA 
93 MILEDIS MARTINEZ 
VICECONSUL EN SAN JUAN-PTO-
RICO 
DECRETO NO. 391-08 DEL 25/08/08 / SOBRINA 
FELIX BAUTISTA 
94 CARLOS MANUEL SANCHEZ ASENSIO VICECONSUL EN SAN MARTEEN 
DECRET. NO. 147-11 DEL 15-03-2011/  FELIX 
BAUTISTA 
95 GUILLERMO DE JESUS ANGELES VICECONSUL EN SEVILLA 
DECRET. NO.662-08 DEL 21-10-08/ FELIX 
BAUTISTA 
96 JUAN GUERRERO VICECONSUL EN TOKYO-JAPON 
DECRET. NO.6-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-
NEW YORK 
97 ABRAHAM MEJIA VICECONSUL EN VALENCIA 
DECRET NO. 662-08 DEL 21-10-08 (MILANO)/ FELIX 
BAUTISTA 
98 JUAN RAMON DURAN VICECONSUL EN ZURICH-SUIZA 
 DECRETO NO. 707-08 DEL 29-10-08 / FELIX 
BAUTISTA 
99 TERESITA PEÑA VICECONSUL-MAYAGUEZ-PTO.RICO 
 DECRET NO.637-09 DEL 25-08-09/ FELIX 
BAUTISTA 
100 ARISTIDES BAUTISTA VICECONSUL-MAYAGUEZ-PTO.RICO 
 DECRETO NO. 391-08 DEL 25/08/08/ HERMANO 
FELIX BAUTISTA 
101 LUZ DEL CARMEN RAMOS PUJOLS VICECONSUL-MAYAGUEZ-PTO.RICO 
 DECRETO NO. 710-08 DEL 29/10/08/ ARISTIDES 
BAUTISTA-HERMANO FELIX 
BAUTISTA 
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Appendix F: Official List of Staff from the Reformist Party (PRSC) in 2013. (Acento.com.do, 2014). Note: The Author of this 
Research Only Removed the Diplomats ID Numbers and Photos. 
 
    
DESIGNACIONES POR DECRETO 
EMBAJADAS PRSC   
NO. NOMBRE CARGO PAIS 
1 VIRGILIO ALVAREZ BONILLA 
EMBAJADOR, DIRECTOR EJECUTIVO - COMISION Mixta BILATERAL 
REP.DOM- PTO- RICO   
2 FLORENTINO CARVAJAL SUERO EMBAJADOR-COMISION Mixta BILATERAL REP.DOM- PTO- RICO   
3 RICARDO ALBERTO ALMONTE ARIAS MINISTRO CONSEJERO  CANADA 
4 FRANCISCA MATILDE FRIAS VARGAS MINISTRO CONSEJERO  ECUADOR 
5 HERNANI ABRAHAM AQUINO HERNANDEZ MINISTRO CONSEJERO NICARAGUA 
6 DIEGO VALLEJO RAMIREZ MINISTRO CONSEJERO  NICARAGUA 
7 VINICIO DE JESUS GRISANTY HERNANDEZ MIINISTRO CONSEJERO JAPON 
8 IGNACIO GONZALEZ FRANCO MINISTRO CONSEJERO  HONG KONG 
9 ALFREDO GONZALEZ SEGURA MINISTRO CONSEJERO HONDURAS 
10 ANTONIO VALENZUELA MINISTRO CONSEJERO  HONDURAS 
11 FERNANDO ANTONIO NUÑEZ MINISTRO CONSEJERO ECUADOR 
12 GERARDO GUEMEZ MERCADO MINISTRO CONSEJERO COSTA RICA 
13 RENE LEONIDAS DE LOS SANTOS CASTILLO MINISTRO CONSEJERO  PANAMA 
14 JOSE NICOLAS DIEGUEZ STEFAN MINISTRO CONSEJERO MISION ONU-SUIZA 
15 MERCEDES GONZALEZ DECENA MINISTRO CONSEJERO  PANAMA 
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16 MIGUEL BOGAERT MARRA MINISTRO CONSEJERO PARAGUAY 
17 JUAN CARLOS RODRIGUEZ VELASQUEZ MINISTRO CONSEJERO PERU 
18 AMADO JOSE RAFUL MINISTRO CONSEJERO  HONG KONG 
19 JORGE MANUEL DARGAM ESPAILLAT MINISTRO CONSEJERO  PARAGUAY 
20 DENNY SUAZO MESA MINISTRA CONSEJERA  PARAGUAY 
21 RAWEL DIOLVANNY MINAYA FIGUEROA MINISTRO CONSEJERO  HOLANDA 
22 GUSTAVO ADOLFO MARTINEZ BOGAERT MINISTRO CONSEJERO HOLANDA 
23 GILBERTO VALDEZ MINISTRO CONSEJERO  PARAGUAY 
24 RAFAEL VASQUEZ MINISTRO CONSEJERO Enc.Seccion Consular RUSIA 
25 
 
AMERICO BOGAERT 
 
MINISTRO CONSEJERO INSPECCION 
26 XIOMARA INMACULADA VALERIO DE NAZIR CONSEJERA PARAGUAY 
27 HECTOR RAFAEL DE MARCHENA GONZALEZ CONSEJERO HOLANDA 
28 CLAUDIO MANUEL ALBURQUERQUE CASTRO CONSEJERO TAIWAN 
29 PELEGRIN ALFREDO CASTILLO ARISTY CONSEJERO ITALIA 
30 DANTE ALFONSO MENDEZ CONSEJERO NICARAGUA 
31 JOSEFINA ALTAGRACIA TEJADA CONSEJERA  NICARAGUA 
32 JUAN ALBERTO MERCADO CONSEJERO MISION ONU-NY 
33 ANGEL SILVIO CAMPUSANO VASQUEZ CONSEJERO NICARAGUA 
34 LEONARDO ANTONIO  REMIGIO PICHARDO CONSEJERO ARGENTINA 
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35 EYMI JIMENEZ HIROMITSU CONSEJERA ARGENTINA 
36 WENDY GOICO CONSEJERA BELGICA 
37 FRANCISCO J. ALVAREZ BRACHE CONSEJERO CANADA 
38 JOVANNY ALMONTE DE LOS SANTOS CONSEJERO CANADA 
39 ALBERTO J .BOGAERT. MOREL CONSEJERO CANADA 
40 CAROLINA ESTHER HERRERA ALVARADO CONSEJERO CANADA 
41 MARCOS ANTONIO DE JESUS ROSA CONSEJERO COLOMBIA 
42 ERICK AUGUSTO BERNARD MATEO CONSEJERO ECUADOR 
43 JOSE DE JESUS ALVAREZ CONSEJERO ESPAÑA 
44 LUCY CAROLINA SANCHEZ GUERRERO CONSEJERA ESPAÑA 
45 NELSON FORTUNA CONSEJERO WASHINGTON 
46 LEON ARMANDO PATIÑO CACERES CONSEJERO  OEA 
47 MARINO EMILIO CACERES B. CONSEJERO MARRUECOS 
48 EDUARDO CINTRON CONSEJERO  
EMIRATOS ARABES 
UNIDOS, ABU DHABI 
49 SILVIO DEMORIZI CONSEJERO GUATEMALA 
50 GRETTER SOCIAS OGANDO CONSEJERA HAITI 
51 JOHANNA MARITT HERNANDEZ SOLIS CONSEJERA   HONDURAS 
52 LEONORA ZACARIAS METZ CONSEJERA   HONDURAS 
53 MANUEL ALFARO RODRIGUEZ CONSEJERO INDIA 
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54 MARCIA ARELIS VASQUEZ SOLANO PRIMERA SECRETARIA ISRAEL 
55 DANI MARIELA JIMENEZ GENAO PRIMERA SECRETARIA MISION OEA 
56 DAMARIS MISOLINA CANELA CORPORAN PRIMERA SECRETARIA  MISION OEA 
57 MARITZA CALDERON MATEO PRIMER SECRETARIO MISION ONU-NY 
58 TOMAS HERNANDEZ LATORRE PRIMER SECRETARIO  CHILE 
59 JOSE FRANCISCO GERONIMO METIVIE PRIMER SECRETARIO PARAGUAY 
60 ROBERTO VARGAS CORDERO PRIMER SECRETARIO HAITI 
61 ANNA BELLE KOSZEWSKI CALCAGNO PRIMERA SECRETARIA   RUSIA 
62 ALEXANDER PEREZ CARRASCO PRIMER SECRETARIO  WASHINGTON 
63 FRANCES FLORENTINO LARA PRIMERA SECRETARIA RUSIA 
64 ANNY PAOLA ALMONTE QUEZADA PRIMER SECRETARIO CANADA 
65 SILVIA GONZALEZ SIERRA PRIMERA SECRETARIA  NICARAGUA 
66 FREDDY ORLANDO ROA TERRERO PRIMER SECRETARIO LONDRES 
67 GREGORIO MEGDIEL POLANCO PEÑA PRIMER SECRETARIO LONDRES 
68 FIOR D ALIZA CABRERA ROMERO PRIMERA SECRETARIA   NICARAGUA 
69 EUGENIO ANTONIO PEREZ PEREZ SEGUNDO SECRETARIO ECUADOR 
70 VALERIO BELLO ROSARIO SEGUNDO SECRETARIO TAIWAN 
71 PASCUAL BAEZ DIAZ SEGUNDO SECRETARIO   HONDURAS 
72 FELIX PEÑA TERCER SECRETARIO  HONDURAS 
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73 HECTOR JULIO FRIAS TERCER SECRETARIO  WASHINGTON 
74 SAMUEL NINA DOÑE AGREGADO CULTURAL CANADA 
    
    
DESIGNACIONES POR DECRETO 
CONSULADOS PRSC   
  NOMBRE CARGO PAIS 
1 JOAQUIN BALAGUER,hijo CONSUL GENERAL NEW ORLEANS 
2 ENRIQUE RICARDO PEYNADO CONSUL GENERAL HONDURAS 
3 GUILLERMO J. ESTRELLA GABRIEL CONSUL GENERAL TORONTO 
4 PRINCE ANTONIO NOGUERA GIL VICECONSUL  ARUBA 
5 DENISE BULOS BARCELO VICECONSUL BOSTON/WASGHINTON 
6 MARCOS VINICIO PAREDES SALCEDO VICE-CONSUL CHICAGO 
7 
GERARDO RAFAEL DE JESUS MALKUM 
PARADA VICECONSUL HAMBURGO 
8 CLAUDIO MANUEL MARRA PEREZ VICECONSUL JAMAICA 
9 CARMEN ROCIO PELLERANO NADAL VICECONSUL MIAMI 
10 FEDERICO AUGUSTO ANTUN HERNANDEZ VICECONSUL NEW ORLEANS 
11 RAUL  ALBERTO NEGRON MORALES VICECONSUL NEW ORLEANS 
12 
CLAUDIO ERNESTO EUSEBIO 
ALBURQUERQUE VICECONSUL NEW YORK 
13 PAMELA MARRA M. VICECONSUL NEW YORK 
14 PASCUAL RAMIREZ VICECONSUL  NEW YORK 
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15 CARLOS ANDRES LORA JAVIER VICE-CONSUL NEW YORK 
16 OSIRIS MANUEL FERNANDEZ SOLANO VICECONSUL PANAMA 
17 TOMAS EMILIO NUÑEZ CASTILLO VICE-CONSUL PANAMA 
18 EDUARDO MORALES GOMEZ VICECONSUL MIAMI 
19 NELSON BALCACER VICECONSUL PUERTO RICO 
20 JORGE NOEL LOPEZ VICE-CONSUL SAN MARTEEN 
21 MILAGROS HILARIO LIZ VICECONSUL COLOMBIA 
22 GLORIA ALEXANDRA CARPIO GONZALEZ AUXILIAR MONTREAL 
23 LEONARDO GIL AUXILIAR NEW YORK 
24 SIRIACO CABRERA RODRIGUEZ AUXILIAR MADRID 
25 CRISTINA NEGRON MORALES AUXILIAR CALIFORNIA 
26 MYRNA GRULLON AUXILIAR MAYAGUEZ 
27 TESS BEMPORAT PAIEWONSKY AUXILIAR MONTREAL 
28 JONNY ALEJANDRO PEREZ LOPEZ AUXILIAR ANTIGUA Y BARBUDAS 
29 LOURDESJASEL ARAMA VERGES PEREZ AUXILIAR HAMBURGO 
30 CESAR AUGUSTO SANTAMARIA REYES AUXILIAR PANAMA 
31 ALEXIS PEREZ CARRASCO AUXILIAR ESPAÑA 
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Appendix G: Official and Complete List of the Best Paid in the Dominican Foreign Affairs, Payroll 2012-2013 (Acento.com.do, 
2014). 
    
DESIGNACIONES POR 
DECRETOS    
                      EMBAJADAS    
  NOMBRES RANGOS/CARGOS DOTACION R. 
  ALEMANIA:  BERLIN     
1 RAFAEL CALVENTI EMBAJADOR EXTR. Y PLENIPOTENC. 25,600.00 
  
ARGENTINA:--BUENO 
AIRES     
2 GUILLERMO PIÑA CONTRERAS EMBAJADOR EXT. PLENIPOTENCIARIO 17,594.50 
  BRASIL:--BRASILIA     
3 HECTOR DIONISIO PEREZ EMBAJADOR EXTR. Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO 25,000.00 
  BRUSELAS, BELGICA:     
4 ALEJANDRO CESAR AUGUSTO  GONZALEZ PONS 
EMBAJADOR EXTR. Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO SUST. A FEDERICO 
CUELLO 31,000.00 
  CANADA:--CANADA     
5 JOSE DEL CARMEN UREÑA ALMONTE EMBAJADOR EXTR. Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO 27,800.00 
  
CHILE:--SANTIAGO DE 
CHILE     
6 PABLO ARTURO MARIÑEZ ALVAREZ EMBAJADOR EXT. Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO 25,000.00 
  COLOMBIA:--BOGOTA     
7 HECTOR GALVAN SUZAÑA EMBAJADOR EXTRAORDINARIO Y PLENIPOTENC. 30,000.00 
  COREA:---SEUL     
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8 GRECIA PICHARDO EMBAJADORA 33,737.00 
  CUBA:--HABANA     
9 JOSE MANUEL CASTILLO EMBAJADOR EXT. Y PLEN. /SUST A DANIEL GUERRERO 26,200.00 
  ECUADOR:--QUITO     
10 VICTOR REYNALDO LORA DIAZ EMBAJADOR 18,700.00 
  
EL SALVADOR:--SAN 
SALVADOR     
11 VICTOR MANUEL SANCHEZ PEÑA EMBAJADOR 12,405.00 
  ESPAÑA:--MADRID     
12 CESAR A. MEDINA ABREU EMBAJADOR EXT Y PLENIPOT  40,000.00 
  
ESTADOS UNIDOS DE 
NORTE 
AMERICA(WASHINGTON)     
13 ANIBAL DE CASTRO EMBAJADOR  EXTRAODINARIO Y PLEN. 24,844.54 
  EGIPTO - CAIRO     
14 MARIA GABRIELLA BONETTI ROSSELLINI EMBAJADORA EXTRAORDINARIA Y PLENIPOTENCIARIA 27,000.00 
  FRANCIA:--PARIS     
15 LAURA FAXAS 
EMBAJADORA EXTRAORDINARIA Y PLENIPOTENC. 32,000.00 
  GUATEMALA:--GUATEMALA     
16 RENE BIENVENIDO SANTANA GONZALEZ EMBAJDOR EXT. Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO 18,420.00 
  HAITI:--PUERTO PRINCIPE     
17 RUBEN ARTURO SILIE VALDEZ EMBAJADOR EXT. Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO 30,000.00 
  HONDURAS:--HONDURA     
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18 JOSE OSVALDO LEGER AQUINO EMBAJADOR EXT. Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO 16,000.00 
  INDIA     
19 HANS DANNENBERG CASTELLANOS EMBAJADOR EXTR. Y PLENIPONTEN 34,500.00 
  ISRAEL:--ISRAEL     
20 ALEXANDER DE LA ROSA EMBAJADOR EXTR. Y PLENIPONTEN 25,000.00 
  ITALIA:--ROMA     
21 VINICIO TOBAL UREÑA EMBAJADOR EXTRAORDINARIO Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO 30,000.00 
  JAMAICA, Kington     
22 JOSE TOMAS ARES GERMAN EMBAJADOR EXTRAORDINARIO Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO 22,000.00 
  JAPON:-TOKYO     
23 PEDRO VERGES EMBAJADOR EXTRAORDINARIO Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO 40,000.05 
  LONDRES, INGLATERRA     
24 FEDERICO ALBERTO CUELLO CAMILO EMBAJADOR EXTRAORDINARIO Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO 30,000.00 
  MARRUECOS     
25 FRANCISCO A. CARABALLO  EMBAJADOR EXTRAORDINARIO Y PLENIP. 33,000.00 
  MEXICO:--MEXICO     
26 FERNANDO PEREZ MEMEN EMBAJADOR EXTRAOR. Y PLENIP. 11,895.30 
  NICARAGUA: MANAGUA     
27 LUIS JOSE GONZALEZ SANCHEZ EMBAJADOR EXT. Y PLENIPONTECIARIO 22,000.00 
  PANAMA:--PANAMA     
28 OCTAVIO ALFREDO LEON LISTER HENRIQUEZ EMBAJADOR EXTR. Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO 25,000.00 
  PARAGUAY: PARAGUAY     
29 MARINO BERIGUETE EMB. EXTRAORDINARIO Y PLENIP. 28,000.00 
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  PERU:--LIMA     
30 RAFAEL JULIAN CEDANO EMBAJADOR EXT. Y PLENIPONT. 12,690.90 
  PORTUGAL:--LISBOA     
31 JAIME DURAN HERNANDO EMBAJADOR EXT. Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO 18,000.00 
  QATAR     
32  HUGO GUILIANI CURY EMBAJADOR EXTRAORDINARIO Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO 38,000.00 
  
REINO DE LOS PAISES 
BAJOS (HOLANDA)     
33 LUIS ARIAS NUÑEZ EMBAJADOR EXT. Y PLENIPONT. 30,000.00 
  RUSIA     
34 JORGE LUIS PEREZ ALVARADO EMBAJADOR EXTRA. Y PLENIP. 30,000.00 
  
SANTA SEDE: ITALIA--
ROMA     
35 VICTOR GRIMALDI EMBAJADOR EXTRA. Y PLENIP. 24,391.00 
  SUECIA:-ESTOCOLMO     
36 MARINA ISABEL CACERES EMBAJADORA EXTR Y PLENIPOTENCIARIA 26,500.00 
  SUDAFRICA     
37 RAUL FERNANDO BARRIENTOS LARA EMBAJADOR EXTRAORDINARIO Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO 30,000.00 
  
 
SUIZA:--SUIZA 
 
    
38 TERESITA MIGDALIA TORRES GARCIA EMBAJADORA  EXTRAORDINARIO Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO 25,000.00 
  
 
TAIWAN --CHINA 
 
    
  99 
39 RAFAELA ALBURQUERQUE DE GONZALEZ EMBAJADORA EXT. Y PLEN. 33,000.00 
  TRINIDAD & TOBAGO:      
40 JOSE SERRULLE RAMIA EMBAJADOR EXTR. Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO 22,000.00 
  URUGUAY--MONTEVIDEO     
41 
 
DANIEL GUERRERO TAVERAS 
 
EMBAJADOR EXTRAORDINARIO Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO 21,447.60 
  VENEZUELA--CARACA     
42 ADONAIDA MEDINA RODRIGUEZ EMBAJADORA EXT. Y PLEN. 30,000.00 
    (SEDE: GINEBRA,SUIZA)   
  
MISIONES PERMANENTES  
EN ORGANISMOS 
INTERNACIONALES 
    
43 ROSA MARGARITA HERNANDEZ CAAMAÑO 
REPRESENTANTE PERMANENTE ANTE LA UNESCO 32,000.00 
  
MISION PERMANENTE 
ANTE LA ONU: NEW YORK   
  
ORGANISMO DE LAS 
NACIONES UNIDAS: (SEDE: 
GINEBRA, SUIZA)     
44 DR. HOMERO LUIS HERNANDEZ SANCHEZ EMBAJADOR REPRESENTANTE P. 
                      
18,000.00  
45 ANGIE SHAKIRA MARTINEZ TEJERA EMBAJADORA  ALTERNA  18,000.00 
46  ELIO PACIFICO EMBAJADOR ALTERNO  12,000.00 
  
ONU- ANTE LA 
ORGANIZACIÓN MUNDIAL     
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DEL COMERCIO (OMC): 
(SEDE: GINEBRA, SUIZA)  
47 LUIS MANUEL PIANTINI MUNNIGH EMBAJADOR REPRESENTANTE ANTE LA OMC 25,000.00 
48 CLAUDIA  HERNANDEZ BONA 
EMBAJADORA  ALTERNA ANTE LA ORG. MUNDIAL DEL COMERCIO 
(OMC) 13,900.00 
49 EDWARD ANIBAL PEREZ REYES EMBAJADOR ALTERNO ANTE LA OMC 10,000.00 
  
MISION PERMANENTE 
ANTE LA OEA: WASHINGTON   
50 ROBERTO BERNARDO SALADIN SELIN EMBAJADOR REPRESENTANT PERM. 25,800.00 
51 JIOVANNY F. RAMIREZ MARTINEZ EMBAJADOR ALTERNO 10,000.00 
52 RUDDY GUILLERMO SANTANA SILVESTRE EMBAJADOR ALTERNO 10,000.00 
53 VICTOR TIRADO EMBAJADOR ALTERNO 7,500.00 
  
MISION PERMANETE ANTE 
LA FAO SEDE ROMA - ITALIA   
54 MARIO ARVELO CAAMAÑO EMBAJADOR  26,580.00 
  
 
VIENA, AUSTRIA 
 
    
55 RAMON QUIÑONEZ EMBAJADOR REPRESENTANTE PERMANENTE 26,580.00 
56 MICHELLE COHEN EMBAJADORA ALTERNA 13,900.00 
57 ROXANNA ALTAGRACIA DE LOS SANTOS PIANTINI EMBAJADORA ALTERNA 12,000.00 
58 GILKA YVELISSE MELENDEZ FERNANDEZ 
EMBAJADORA ALTERNA 13,000.00 
 
